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Abstract
Data-intensive research computing requires the capability to transfer files over
long distances at high throughput. Stateful firewalls introduce sufficient packet loss
to prevent researchers from fully exploiting high bandwidth-delay network links [25].
To work around this challenge, the science DMZ design [19] trades off stateful packet
filtering capability for loss-free forwarding via an ordinary Ethernet switch. We pro-
pose a novel extension to the science DMZ design, which uses an SDN-based firewall.
This report introduces NFShunt, a firewall based on Linux’s Netfilter combined
with OpenFlow switching. Implemented as an OpenFlow 1.0 controller coupled to
Netfilter’s connection tracking, NFShunt allows the bypass-switching policy to be
expressed as part of an iptables firewall rule-set. Our implementation is described
in detail, and latency of the control-plane mechanism is reported. TCP through-
put and packet loss is shown at various round-trip latencies, with comparisons to
pure switching, as well as to a high-end Cisco firewall. Cost, as well as operations
and maintenance aspects, are compared and analysed. The results support reported
observations regarding firewall introduced packet-loss, and indicate that the SDN
design of NFShunt is a technically viable and cost-effective approach to enhancing
a traditional firewall to meet the performance needs of data-intensive researchers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Importance of data-intensive science
Gordon Bell argues that data-intensive computing is the basis for a new paradigm of
science [36]. The idea of e-Science is that data-exploration is a new scientific method
that unifies theory, experimentation and simulation. Cyber-infrastructure is therefore
critical to modern science, and the network is the central component that moves data
between computing resources (and indirectly to the researchers).
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) [14] serves as an example of a scientific instrument
and its associated experiments with data-intensive infrastructure requirements. The dis-
tributed manner in which data produced at the LHC is analysed led to new architectures
for network provisioning and security, for example, the LHC Optical Private Network
(OPN) [8]. The distributed processing strategy itself was developed to cope with un-
precedented volumes of scientific data, where network transfers were measured in tens
of gigabits per second [75].
Early work to understand the network needs of the Square Kilometre Array (SKA)
[21] radio-telescope has identified a new large-data frontier, this time in the order of
hundreds of gigabits per second [39]. Just as a novel approach was applied for the needs
of the LHC, so will each successive data-intensive experiment need to find efficient ways
to distribute, store and analyse data.
Gorton et al. list astronomy and cyber-security as applications that exhibit the char-
acteristics of being both data and computationally intensive. Since High Performance
Computing (HPC) facilities are themselves exposed to cyber-security threats [32], the
need to apply cyber-security measures to HPC compounds the total complexity of data-
intensive applications.
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McMahon and Hutchison [52] suggest that standard security measures (such as a
firewall) can be applied to protect HPC infrastructure, and propose a security archi-
tecture based on such standard components. Quite contrary to this work, ESNet [25]
reports that packet loss in high speed networking is often caused by standard firewalls.
According to ESNet [25], firewalls are supposed to behave transparently for legitimate
traffic but, due to scalability constraints in the special case of large network transfers,
they do not do so. When high latency transfers are attempted through such firewalls, the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) stack throttles a connection’s window size because
packet loss is interpreted as network congestion and, as a result the data throughput
achieved is much less than the nominal network capacity. Given the high cost of inter-
national connectivity, this is a practical and important efficiency problem for globally
distributed data-intensive research infrastructures.
Since network latency is bound by the speed of light, the solution is either to mitigate
the effect of packet loss on applications by adapting their use of the network, or to
eliminate the cause of the loss itself.
If the critical role of high speed networks in data-intensive computing is at odds with
deployed network security measures, then it is important to study this apparent conflict,
and propose solutions.
1.2 State of the art
High performance network security and Fast Data Transfer (FDT) are both subjects of
active research. This section describes the relevant state of the art.
1.2.1 Hardware acceleration
According to ESNet [22], hardware firewalls are capable of stateful filtering (see sec-
tion 2.4) of Internet Protocol (IP) packets at line rate when employing parallelised
architecture, which spreads individual network flows (unique connections between two
network endpoints) over a number of specialised network processor cores.
In a typical hardware firewall, each network processor’s peak performance is less than
the total throughput of the firewall [25]. Normally individual flow throughput is limited
elsewhere (often at one of the endpoints) to the extent that this architecture scales well
for traffic composed of many small flows (such as typical Internet traffic).
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Figure 1.1: Example science DMZ network diagram
1.2.2 FDT-optimized tools
One way to work around poor TCP performance is to spread data transfers over a
number of (lower rate) parallel connections (striping). This technique was developed
to compensate for end-host TCP window size tuning problems, but could also allow for
higher total throughput in high latency transfers exposed to packet loss.
GridFTP [2] is an extension of the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) that employs parallel
TCP connections to improve throughput.
1.2.3 Simplified filtering
Another solution is to engineer networks to be suitable for high performance TCP by
eliminating the firewall itself (and therefore the lossy component). ESNet proposes a
network design called the science demilitarised zone (DMZ) [19].
The idea of a science DMZ is to create a small, fast subnetwork at the edge of the
network at each institution (e.g., universities, research labs, etc.), which is devoid of
middle-boxes (in other words, it is connected before the firewall). High latency transfers
(originating from distant endpoints) are therefore not subjected to the performance-
degrading effect of packet loss caused by middle-boxes, while transfers from inside the
institutional network (and therefore beyond the border firewall) are low latency – there-
fore not subject to the same effect.
Figure 1.1 illustrates an example of this design: network traffic represented by the
green arrow traverses the “clean” network, while the orange line represents local (low-
latency) traffic.
It is argued that computing resources in the science DMZ can be adequately protected
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from intruders by making use of simplistic (but scalable) router interface Access Control
Lists (ACLs), combined with host security measures [19].
As side benefits, this architecture also alleviates operational conflicts resulting from
attempts to shoehorn a firewall security policy designed for protecting enterprise Local
Area Networks (LANs) to serve the unusual networking needs of scientific computing
applications, and encourages efficient scaling of network elements for the specific needs of
each class of network end-host (enterprise LAN versus science computing infrastructure).
1.2.4 Intrusion prevention with shunting
A third alternative is to separate the network traffic belonging to data-intensive sci-
ence applications from other flows, and only apply security measures to the remainder.
This approach makes use of a custom hardware switch called a shunt [31], which is pro-
grammed to either bypass or forward traffic via an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).
An analysis of packet traces from institutions typically running data-intensive appli-
cations shows that shunting (the mechanism of hardware bypass-switching of network
traffic otherwise processed in software) can reduce the amount of network traffic for-
warded via the “slow path” significantly, allowing the system to run at the full speed of
the institution’s network connection.
More recently, SciPass enhanced shunting to take advantage of OpenFlow-based
hardware switching [5]. While the original shunt work aimed to address the problem
of IPS scalability, SciPass leveraged bypass switching for the enhancement of science
DMZs.
1.3 Limitations of the state of the art
1.3.1 Load balancing
According to ESNet [25], in data-intensive science applications where endpoints are
optimised to allow transfers at speeds close to the limit of the underlying network,
a hardware firewall architecture which relies on load-balancing (increasing aggregate
capacity through parallel processing) over multiple network processors drops packets,
resulting in poor TCP performance with high-latency flows.
1.3.2 Specialised protocols
Specialised applications, employing the parallel-TCP connections strategy to improve
throughput, suffer from operational and adoption problems:
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• Ports and protocols used by non-standard applications are often blocked by the
standard policy configured on the same firewall - the limitations of which they are
designed to work around [44].
• We speculate that applications using existing (albeit lower performance) proto-
cols are more convenient for some end-users. For example, Secure Copy Protocol
(SCP) (a single-flow TCP based file transfer application) is installed by default
on most servers, and is integrated with the operating system’s authentication and
authorisation mechanism [17].
1.3.3 Simplified filtering
A firewall is described as an insurance policy for the manager or executive at an institu-
tion accountable for cyber-security [18]. It is understandable then that some institutions
are reluctant to adopt the simplified design of the science DMZ (which does not make
use of a firewall in the usual sense).
Since no network security measure is absolutely effective, in the case of a breach, it
could be difficult for the responsible officer to explain to the board (or relevant authority)
why there was no firewall in place.
Given this human bias against simplified filtering, making use of a firewall that de-
livers suitable performance for FDT is perhaps the path of least institutional resistance.
1.3.4 Shunting
The use of a custom hardware platform for shunting allows for flexibility in the exact
operation of the shunt itself, but limits the practicality of wide-spread deployment.
Using standardised off-the-shelf hardware for the shunting component would permit
convenient substitutions, and take advantage of the economy of scale available due to
mass production of such components. SciPass [5] enhances shunting by employing a
standard hardware fast-path.
Shunting and SciPass both address scalability of intrusion detection. SciPass includes
the capability to shunt trusted connections around a traditional firewall based on IDS
signatures, but neither system attempts to implement standard firewall interfaces or
semantics with a single policy for both slow and fast path switching.
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1.4 A new approach
Previous work with OpenFlow in the FDT context has applied it to the management
of (stateless) access control lists [72], and the implementations of shunting focused on
intrusion detection applications [5,31]. Similarly, previous work to add hardware-oﬄoad
acceleration for the Linux Netfilter firewall (see section 2.9) has relied on a custom kernel
module communicating with specialised hardware, such as a Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) [15] or a Network Processing Unit (NPU) [1].
We research a shunting strategy for firewalls, which on the forwarding plane is similar
to the science DMZ, but the addition of a control plane driven by a stateful firewall ruleset
results in functionality very similar to a traditional firewall. The contribution of our
research is the hybrid shunting firewall design, a prototype implementation (NFShunt)
and an analysis of the prototype’s performance.
Our hybrid approach has an advantage of both the science DMZ and stateful firewall
solutions, in that it would eliminate some of the trade-off between security and per-
formance, and be implementable in real-world applications by making use of existing,
well-understood and tested off-the-shelf components. We use OpenFlow to decouple the
control logic of the firewall from switch hardware — the central principle of Software
Defined Networking (SDN) (see section 2.5).
It is important to note that stateless bypass switching inevitably compromises the
ability of the system to check the validity of packet headers against expected protocol
state, as well as other packet filtering capabilities (such as application-layer inspection),
subsequent to shifting the traffic to the fast-path. This limitation is common to our
prototype hybrid firewall and similar designs, such as SciPass. Table 1.1 summarises the
performance and security trade-offs offered by the hybrid approach and its alternatives.
We only consider a use-case involving single or small numbers of TCP connections.
The research does not address a comprehensive threat-model for science DMZs, cater
for non-TCP applications, or examine connection-rate performance.
Approach Performance Security
Access Control Lists High Low
Traditional firewall Low High
Hybrid (shunting) firewall High Medium
Table 1.1: Comparison of Science DMZ protection mechanims
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1.5 Overview of the thesis
This report is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the background to our research: we review relevant technologies
and critically analyse related work in the literature. Chapter 3 describes the research
problem, and our prototype firewall’s design and implementation. Chapter 4 covers our
research method for experimental evaluation, and reports the results of our experiments.
Chapter 5 presents our analysis of the prototype implementation and evaluation. Finally,
in chapter 6, we draw conclusions from our study and explore future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
The performance of network applications in the presence of network packet filtering is a
function of interrelated effects: the transport layer protocol implementation (e.g., Trans-
mission Control Protocol (TCP)) reacts to network conditions, that are in turn affected
by the architecture of the network packet filter. It is, therefore, necessary to understand
the theoretical background and practical implementation of packet forwarding and fil-
tering, in addition to the network traffic profile of the applications of relevance to the
research.
When examining different implementations of packet forwarding and filtering de-
vices, it is important to consider the separation between the following: the mechanisms
that handle individual packets, namely the forwarding plane (or data path); and the
control mechanisms that maintain data structures used by the forwarding plane to make
decisions about how to handle packets, namely the control plane.
Our hybrid firewall combines a bypass switching (shunting) strategy with the use
of a standard software interface for controlling the hardware component. Each of these
technologies (as well as existing work to combine them in similar architectures) are
explored in the sections that follow.
2.2 Fast data transfer
Network use-cases for data intensive science require Fast Data Transfer (FDT). More
specifically:
1. Large (sometimes Peta-byte-sized) data sets are moved between different locations
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on the network [36]. For example, raw experimental data may be collected by
sensors or instruments at one location, processed at a second location (on a super-
computer), and the output then analysed by scientists at a third location.
2. Unlike commodity Internet traffic, which is typically comprised of many simultane-
ous (relatively low speed) TCP flows, the data is often transferred between single
endpoint systems, and maximum throughput is required for single TCP sessions.
The distribution of connection data volumes for various types of network traffic
follows a heavy-tailed distribution [41], meaning that a small number of connections
account for a large proportion of the total data transferred, while the majority of the
connections transfer a small amount of data. Gonzales et al. [31] apply their shunting
technique to large connections in six different network traffic data sets gathered from
universities, research labs and a super computing centre. They find that the heavy
tail flow effect is even more prevalent where the use of the network tends towards the
specialised applications of High Performance Computing (HPC).
2.2.1 TCP performance challenges
The TCP protocol interprets packet loss as congestion on the network path between
end-points, resulting in packets being dropped from router interface queues, and uses
this information to adjust the rate at which data is transmitted to match the capacity
available.
Unfortunately, queue drops resulting from link congestion are not necessarily the only
causes of loss. Using the model for TCP performance developed by Mathis et al. [49], it
can be seen that the combination of modest packet loss rates on high bandwidth-latency
product links results in pathological inefficiency on links that are not fully utilised.
Among the variants of TCP, some implementations are adapted for high speed (for
example: HighSpeed TCP [29], Scalable TCP [40] and FAST TCP [81]). Difficulties
in the design of TCP congestion control algorithms are: achieving high throughput in
diverse (and variable) network conditions while also maintaining fairness (the equal
sharing of bottleneck link capacity among all TCP connections), and avoiding biases
among connections according to Round-Trip Time (RTT).
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) extends TCP to distinguish between error
drops and queue drops [70], which is promising for supporting FDT with non-congestive
packet loss. While ECN is now commonly supported in both end-host operating systems,
as well as network equipment, it must be enabled both on the hosts and on the underlying
network to be effective. This constraint has been problematic for the use of ECN in long
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distance inter-domain network applications: a recent study by Ku¨hlewind et al. [42]
showed that the majority of TCP connections on the Internet still cannot use ECN.
In addition to the bootstrapping problem between host and router support, the
adoption of ECN has been further hampered by the interference of poorly considered
firewall policies [79]. This is incongruous with the fact that ECN might otherwise permit
the use of firewalls for FDT.
The latency constraint is often an unavoidable physical constraint that is a conse-
quence of the global nature of modern collaborative big science projects. Clearly loss-free
networks are critical for the use of single TCP connections in high-bandwidth applica-
tions.
2.2.2 Alternative protocols for FDT
Proposals exist for new protocols that perform well despite packet loss in high bandwidth-
delay product networks.
One example of an application-layer protocol is GridFTP [2], which extends the File
Transfer Protocol (FTP) to suit the needs of FDT. One GridFTP feature is the ability to
establish multiple parallel TCP connections between a pair of servers. A pool of servers
containing the same data can also be used in parallel (in striping mode), futher improving
the scalability of GridFTP-based systems by accessing the independent storage back-
ends simultaneously. GridFTP protocol is also used in the Globus Toolkit and the
Globus Online service [3]. Parallel TCP connections can be effective at working around
throughput limitations (due to packet loss and poor host tuning) because individual
congestion windows are smaller while the aggregate throughput is increased.
Alternatives to TCP for large file transfers include various UDP-based protocols,
such as UDT, and commercial products such as Aspera’s FAST; MTP/IP from Data
Expedition; and TIXEL’s RWTP. Dart notes [17] that these protocols deal well with
congestive packet loss, but their performance in high latency un-congested links (typical
research network) is less clear.
Despite their advantages, alternative protocols face adoption challenges (similar to
ECN). GridFTP has been successful in the grid computing community but is not without
its own challenges, one being the need to allow non-standard ports on firewalls [44].
UDP-based protocols have been successful for commercial applications but have seen
limited deployment in research networks.
We also note that proposals for alternative protocols and applications, compete for
adoption, which suggests that no general solution exists. The efforts to propose and
then promote alternative protocols are important and valid in their approach, but it is
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also important to explore other solutions to the broader FDT problem.
Rather than adapting network applications to suit the network, the science DMZ
architecture aims to engineer the network to support all (including non-optimised) ap-
plications. Our research focuses on the network-based approach to FDT.
2.3 High speed packet switching
Expansion of the Internet has required the evolution of network technologies to deliver
higher speed networks. In this section we explore the state of the art in electronic
network packet switching.
2.3.1 Software switching
Forwarding or switching of Internet Protocol packets is performed by a router (or gate-
way). In addition to making switching decisions (choosing an output interface for each
packet), a router must also be able to translate between different network media. There-
fore its functions must extend from the physical to the network layer. The basic steps
common to all IP routing are:
1. Next-hop (route) lookup,
2. Decrementing the Time To Live (TTL) counter,
3. Recalculating the checksum,
4. Layer 2 header re-writing.
In addition to packet forwarding, a router itself must be able to act end-node to
enable it to interact with other nodes for the purposes of administration and monitor-
ing, building routing tables, error handling and so on. The functions of a router can,
therefore, be divided into two areas: the forwarding plane and the control plane.
The complexity of control plane functions require software running on a general
purpose microprocessor. Early routers also implemented the control and forwarding
plane function as subroutines of the same software, as the processing power available
was sufficient to support the data rates required. Network protocols were also rapidly
evolving, making a software implementation well suited to updates and improvement.
Consequently, the hardware architecture of IP routers were similar to that of general
purpose computers, utilising a centralised memory and a shared peripheral bus [4].
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As data rates on inter-networks increased, optimisations were made to the IP for-
warding process, for example: commonly used routes were cached for faster routing
decisions, and the actual packet forwarding process could be moved into an interrupt
handler to avoid packets being delayed by process scheduling in the router operating
system.
2.3.2 Hardware switching
When attempting to scale software IP forwarding to hundreds or even thousands of
megabits per second, it becomes apparent that bus and memory bandwidths must be
twice the total port capacity of the router, as each packet is copied twice during the
routing process [4].
While it is now possible to achieve small-packet 10Gbps line-rate L2 and L3 switching
with a small number of interfaces in software [83], we note that the bar for switching
performance has been raised to 100Gbps.1 The calibrated model developed by Meyer
et al. [54] predicts that future single-flow performance of software packet processing will
remain constrained by single-core performance. To overcome this, modern multi-gigabit
networks rely on specialised packet forwarding hardware.
One of the simplest hardware optimisations is to off-load some of the processing
tasks to fixed-function circuitry, such as verifying a packet checksum to the receiving
network interface controller. Moving beyond this initially proved problematic because
the Internet protocol was not designed with a hardware forwarding plane in mind. This
led to the development of label switching as a simpler alternative to IP routing, and a
means to encapsulate IP and other network and data-link layer protocols in transport
networks [61].
Eventually, advances in integrated circuit technology permitted pure hardware for-
warding to be implemented, including dedicated longest-prefix route look-up state ma-
chines. Most high speed routers now employ Application-Specific Integrated Circuits
(ASICs) or occasionally Network Processing Units (NPUs) in the forwarding plane.
In order to keep ASICs simple enough to allow line-rate forwarding in practical
implementations, certain features are not catered for in the hardware path, for example:
IP options change the length of the header itself and are, therefore, “punted” to a
software router implementation running on a general-purpose microprocessor (often the
same processor running the router’s control plane software). This hybrid fast/slow path
1100Gbps Ethernet Network Interface Controllers (NICs) as well as 32-port 100Gbps 1-RU switches
were available as of early 2015.
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approach is reminiscent of route caching and re-appears in contemporary network designs
(sometimes in combination with route caching).
One of the key advantages afforded by the stateless nature of the Internet protocol
is that routing is an embarrassingly parallel workload. In a single router, multiple
(distributed) copies of routing tables can, therefore, be used by more than one forwarding
engine in parallel, thereby eliminating the need for shared access to memory.
2.4 Traditional firewall designs
Blocking certain connections and allowing others has become a popular measure to pro-
tect end-hosts (and consequently the users and organisations) connected to the Internet.
This function is performed by a firewall [77].
The state machine used for route lookup (matching a header field against a data
structure of values and masks) can be used to implement a simple packet filter (also
known as an Access Control List (ACL)), with actions that specify whether a matching
packet should be dropped or forwarded. Strictly speaking, a router with ACL capability
is then also a firewall, however the capabilities of firewalls have surpassed simplistic
packet filtering.
Stateful (or state-aware) firewalls take into account the state of the transport protocol
connection, thereby protecting against a class of network attacks that cannot be blocked
using (stateless) packet filters. We focus on TCP which, being connection-oriented, is
inherently stateful. Figure 2.1 describes the connection states of a TCP session. Other
state information associated with a TCP connection includes the congestion control
algorithm (not usually a security concern) and sequence numbers, which could be checked
in a firewall to defend against spoofing attacks [34]. A simple example of the advantage
of stateful firewalling is a typical scenario for firewall configuration, namely the TCP
diode. Suppose an organisation wishes to implement the following policy:
1. Hosts on the Local Area Network (LAN) (clients) can initiate TCP connections to
web servers on the Internet (on port 80).
2. TCP connections from the Internet to the LAN are blocked.
In practice, the above policy would be translated into a firewall rule set. For a
stateless packet filter, the following rules could be used (evaluated sequentially):
1. Forward packets where the protocol is TCP, direction is to the Internet, and the
TCP destination port is 80.
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Figure 2.1: TCP connection state diagram (from Sergiodc2, M. Pauley, and Scil100 [73])
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2. Forward packets where the protocol is TCP, direction is to the LAN, and the TCP
destination port is ephemeral.2
3. Drop any packet.
The second rule is necessary to allow the client-to-server direction of the TCP stream,
but mapping this rule-set back to the policy reveals that TCP connections from the
Internet to the LAN are not blocked if the source port is 80 and the destination port
is ephemeral. An attacker’s client application (bound to port 80) could connect to a
malware server on the LAN.
The second rule would be superfluous with stateful TCP tracking, as return packets
would be associated with the connection permitted by the first rule. By removing the
second rule, stateful tracking can protect against the attack described above.
While it is useful to examine hybrid and Software Defined Networking (SDN)-based
stateless firewalls in our critical analysis of related work, we limit our study of firewall
performance to the stateful (state-of-the-art) type.
Stateful packet filtering requires forwarding plane support for functions that are not
easily handled at high speeds. For example: IP fragments (which may not contain the
original packet’s transport layer headers) require re-assembly; an operation that adds
extra buffering, lookups and time-out proceeding for each affected packet; whereas an
IP router could simply forward fragments without re-assembly. Keeping track of a TCP
connection’s state requires a connection table update for each packet, therefore, stateful
firewalling is not an embarrassingly parallel task if distributed on a per-packet basis.
It follows that state-of-the-art firewalls have more processing to do (per-packet) than
IP routers. Given access to the same basic technology (silicon process density and
power budget), the increased complexity of a firewall would result in fewer packets being
processed in the same time compared to an IP router. We support this argument by
first noting that common switch ASICs (so-called merchant silicon) are not capable
of supporting sophisticated packet processing [57], and then examining the suitability
of the hardware architectures typically used to implement stateful firewalls in the two
subsections that follow:
2.4.1 CPU-software firewalls
Modern server operating systems integrate mature host firewall functionality. Host fire-
walls typically process packets to and from the transport layer on the host itself, however,
2dynamically allocated by the client from a range of port numbers not requiring super-user privileges.
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Figure 2.2: Hardware architecture of the Cisco ASA 5585
the operating system network stack can usually also bridge and route packets (switching
on layer 2 and layer 3, respectively). Netfilter (the Linux kernel packet filter) is capable
of stateful firewalling of both host-terminated as well as routed and bridged connections.
We describe Netfilter in detail in section 2.9.
Despite the single-core small-packet-rate limitations of pure software routers and
firewalls, which we introduced in section 2.3.2, modern software firewall implementations
can scale to high aggregate throughputs for medium to large packet sizes.
While our investigation begins with the observation that this architecture is not
well suited for FDT [25], we acknowledge that software firewalls could adequately serve
many, or perhaps most, other network applications. Some high-end commercial firewalls
(including the Cisco ASA tested in our experiments) are implemented on commodity
server components in a customised chassis. Based on a Cisco presentation [64] and logs
from the system tested, we inferred the internal architecture of the Cisco ASA 5585,
illustrated in figure 2.2.
High performance packet processing on general-purpose hardware relies on directing
packets of each transport flow to the same core of one or more multi-core CPUs. A
thread for each core is configured to service a different packet queue on a multi-queue
network interface. Drivers and network stacks employ polling (instead of interrupts),
and eliminate copying of buffers to improve throughput and reduce latency. Most re-
cently, user-space forwarding plane implementations such as Data Plane Development
Kit (DPDK) [20] eliminated processing bottlenecks in the operating system to achieve
even higher throughput.
The primary advantage of CPU-based packet processing is the highest flexibility
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available for implementing complex functions such as stateful packet filtering or payload
inspection [68].
2.4.2 Network processors
Multi-core processors providing parallelism intended specifically for hardware network
forwarding planes are known as Network Processing Units (NPU). NPUs typically com-
prise a large number of simplified Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) cores
designed for executing event-driven code that performs tasks typical in network equip-
ment. Marketing material for commercial hardware firewalls from ForiNet and Juniper
claim to employ NPU-based designs.
The advantage of an NPU over an ASIC is flexibility better suited to complex tasks
[33], similar to CPUs but with greater forwarding performance, at the cost of constraints
of per-core resources and a more complex programming model.
Casado et al. [13] observed that NPU vendors initially struggled to strike a complexity-
flexibility trade-off which was attractive to the market, while more recently Pongra´cz et
al. [68] (authors from Ericsson – also an NPU vendor) state that, measured in perfor-
mance per Watt, recent NPUs outperform CPUs even for complex tasks (unfortunately
without elaborating on how they reached this conclusion – for example, which tasks were
tested).
The literature is lacking in rigorous performance comparisons between NPUs and
other architectures for the application of stateful firewalls, but there is consensus on the
general (and intuitive) principle that each hardware platform lies on a curve that relates
forwarding performance and processing flexibility. McKeown estimates the successive
increases in speed between CPUs, NPUs and ASICs to be one order of magnitude [50].
This supports our earlier argument that a hardware firewall would need to trade off
between these two attributes of the underlying technology.
2.5 OpenFlow
OpenFlow is a standard that implements the idea of SDN [51]. The control plane
functions of network elements can be centralised (to a so-called controller) by providing
a remotely programmable interface for the control plane functions, in order to manipulate
forwarding plane configuration. While some definitions of SDN extend far beyond fine-
grained programmability of packet forwarding behaviour, we focus on OpenFlow as a
realisation of SDN.
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Figure 2.3: Architecture of a Software Defined Network
In an OpenFlow switch, forwarding plane actions are encoded in a series of switch-
ing hardware memory tables [63]. Except for wild-card protocol field matching (which
was not supported in earlier generation switch ASICs), OpenFlow does not define new
forwarding plane behaviour, instead it makes use of the existing functions used by embed-
ded control plane software found in common switching and routing hardware. OpenFlow
controllers can manipulate the switching tables inside any OpenFlow-capable switch by
managing so-called flow entries. Flow entries can be specified in multiple tables that form
a packet processing pipeline. The component responsible for implementing OpenFlow
functions in a switch is called the agent.
A flow entry specifies matching rules, counters and actions to be applied to network
traffic traversing the OpenFlow switch. This match-action abstraction is the central
contribution of OpenFlow. Using the OpenFlow protocol, it is possible for software to
remotely control packet switching with a high degree of granularity.
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Figure 2.3 shows the interfaces between network devices, controllers and applications.
The components and interfaces indicated in red represent the addition of OpenFlow as
the basic technology to enable Software Defined Networking.
The pragmatic re-use of existing technology allowed an evolution toward SDN. Much
progress has been made, first by the network research community and then by industry,
in creating software platforms for OpenFlow controllers. Multiple network equipment
manufacturers are now providing OpenFlow capability in their switches and routers.
2.6 open vSwitch
open vSwitch (OVS) is an implementation of OpenFlow which is typically used as a
virtual switch.
Virtual switches are deployed in conjunction with server virtualisation technology (so-
called hypervisors) to provide network connectivity to virtual machines. OVS is Free and
Open Source Software (FOSS), and gained popularity with the rise of hypervisors such
as Xen and KVM. While the goal of OVS is to provide a flexible, performant platform
for overlay networking and packet classification for virtual machines, it is also both an
OpenFlow switch and OpenFlow agent [66].
OVS’s multi-layer architecture separates the control plane from the software forward-
ing path, which in turn has a fast exact-match cache and a slow path that handles cache
misses (performing more complex wildcard or longest-prefix matching). The systems
design of loosely coupled components has proven useful for switching implementations
with different data paths, including both user and kernel-space, as well as hardware
oﬄoading (described in section 2.7.2).
The OpenFlow switch that we used in the implementation of our prototype firewall
includes OVS as its OpenFlow agent. Consequently, OVS is used extensively in our
research, and we therefore describe OVS’s architecture and configuration in further detail
below.
2.6.1 Architecture
The architecture of the OVS OpenFlow agent component is composed of two user-space
server processes, some command-line utilities and a configuration database (illustrated
in figure 2.4).
Connections to the OpenFlow controller and interfacing with the forwarding plane
(or data-path in OVS terminology) is handled by ovs-vswitchd.
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Figure 2.4: OVS agent architecture
2.6.2 OVS utilities
The ovs-ofctl utility allows the user to manually manipulate the flow tables of the
switch without a controller.
While ovs-appctl and ovs-dpctl query and modify some run-time state of
ovs-vswitchd, the configuration of the OpenFlow switch instances are instead obtained
from a separate server process: ovsdb-server. Persistent configuration created by the
ovs-vsctl utility is stored in the ovsdb file, and applied to ovs-vswitchd via ovsdb-
server. The stored configuration can either be retrieved with the ovsdb-client utility,
or the ovsdb file can be manipulated directly with ovsdb-tool.
2.6.3 OVS usage
A detailed example of OVS usage is provided in appedix A.
2.7 Hybrid forwarding
Beginning with flow caching in software-only routers, the designers of switching plat-
forms have often employed the optimisation of switching the forwarding path of packets
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between sophisticated-but-slow and simple-but-fast mechanisms, as an optimisation and
a work-around to the inherent trade-offs we observed in the preceding sections.
This re-occuring hybrid design pattern of acceleration or bypass switching is applied
in the prototype firewall we developed in our research. We explore related work on
hybrid forwarding in this section.
2.7.1 Multi-layer virtual switches
Mekky et al. extend OVS, adding so-called application tables to enable application-
layer processing of flows in the vSwitch without having to send packets to the control
plane [53]. Similarly FAST [56] and OpenState [7] add capability for flow state tracking
to the virtual switch. By leveraging the TCP options field match type in OVS, FAST
can be used to implement a stateful firewall. At the time of writing, hardware switches
supporting OpenFlow 1.5 (which includes the TCP options match type) were not yet
commercially available.
2.7.2 Co-processor fast-path
Some hybrid architectures partially oﬄoad packet processing to NPUs or fixed-function
hardware pipelines (co-processors):
Yang and Yonggang [82] demonstrate a hybrid Netfilter-based firewall leveraging a
tightly coupled Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)-CPU forwarding plane. Their
implementation modified the Linux kernel with Netfilter hooks that examine packet
headers in the CPU, while the complete packet remains queued in the forwarding plane.
Similarly, Chen et al. [15] add hardware-oﬄoad acceleration for Netfilter, with a custom
kernel module communicating with a data path implemented on NetFPGA [45], and
Accardi et al. [1] implement the same scheme on an NPU. In the broad sense, both
of these systems are SDN firewalls, but tight coupling to the hardware limits their
suitability for vendor-agnostic deployments.
Split SDN Data Plane (SSDP) [57] is another hybrid approach that off-loads com-
plex processing to an NPU subsystem in an ASIC-based hardware switch. The authors
demonstrate deep packet inspection as an application. SSDP differs from the above
hybrid designs in that it defines an interface for the NPU subsystem to be configured
by a single SDN controller, an approach that has the potential for standardised and
widespread deployment.
Finally, some ASIC based switches integrate OVS in the control plane, and employ
the multi-layer flow-cache approach to accelerate traffic after the initial packets of a flow
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are punted to the control plane.
2.7.3 Co-processor slow-path
The inverse approach of hardware off-loading of packet forwarding in a software system,
is the off-loading of complex packet processing to software in a hardware switch. While
this approach is commonly used for handling packet processing exceptions (punting)
without specific concern for the performance impact (as highlighted in section 2.3.2),
some designs include software co-processing to add state tracking and application layer
processing features to otherwise hardware-only forwarding.
Lu et al. [47] use this approach to enable large routing tables, and packet buffering
with a server platform, combined with ServerSwitch [46] – a switch ASIC on a plug-in
card. It is not clear what the advantage of ServerSwitch is, compared to leveraging an
open control plane interface for ASIC programming and out-of-band forwarding plane
connections between the switch and the server (the approach used for our prototype).
2.7.4 Control plane advanced packet processing
One configurable OpenFlow action is for the switch to tunnel packets to and from the
controller via so-called packet-in and packet-out messages [63]. It is then possible for the
controller to inspect packets directly and perform forwarding decisions in the traditional
punt-and-switch architecture employed by many hardware routers.
OpenFlow can simplify the local functions of a switch because certain tasks are han-
dled by the controller, reducing the need, for example, to compute an optimal forwarding
table when routing changes occur. This affords equipment vendors the cost savings of
using low performance system-on-chip processors to run the OpenFlow agent. Unfortu-
nately, such processors limit the performance of packet-in/packet-out forwarding via the
OpenFlow controller.
The second problem with packet-in/packet-out tunnelling is that OpenFlow mes-
sages are typically transported over TCP, and when the packets within the tunnel are
themselves transporting TCP traffic, interaction of TCP retransmission timers can lead
to poor performance [78].
Collings and Liu [16] note scalability constraints when relying on OpenFlow con-
trollers to process forwarding plane traffic. Nevertheless, we note existing proposals for
advanced packet processing (such as stateful connection tracking) continue to rely on
packet-in/packet-out tunnelling.
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2.7.5 Forwarding plane advanced packet processing
For the most part, the evolution of OpenFlow sees the inclusion of new match and
action types with each subsequent version of the specification. The state-of-the-art in
SDN seeks to extend the capability of the forwarding plane beyond the constraints of
OpenFlow in two dimensions: protocol independence and stateful processing.
Protocol independence would allow the structure of packet headers to be defined
independently of the hardware structure of the data-plane. P4 [9] proposes the use of
a compiler to transform a logical definition of protocols, and the associated processing
that can be performed, into configuration for flexible packet switching hardware. A P4
switch is therefore truly software defined (or re-defined at run-time), and can then be
controlled by a protocol like OpenFlow during operation. It remains to be seen whether
protocol independence can be delivered by a generation of more flexible switch ASICs,
or if it will be realised by widespread deployment of NPUs in general-purpose switches.
The implication of protocol independence on the design of firewalls is significant.
Once the structure of packets is software defined, the enforcement of network security
policies must also be equally flexible and independent of hardware platforms. This would
apply even to stateless packet filtering (ACLs).
While stateful packet processing can currently be performed in software (on general
purpose CPUs or NPUs), future software defined networks may see the inclusion of simple
state machines in switch ASICs, leveraging an open standard to define them (along the
lines of OpenState or FAST). These developments are promising for the implementation
of high performance firewalls, but we believe careful consideration should be given to
the mapping between network flows and expensive hardware resources (such as Ternary
Content-Addressable Memory (TCAM) entries) if and when this capability is realised.
2.8 OpenFlow-based firewalls
The OpenFlow specification not only allows flexible control over how packets are for-
warded by hardware, but also whether they are switched at all. This enables packet
filtering in the switch based on flows programmed by a controller designed to implement
a specific security policy. We now explore existing work in this area:
2.8.1 OpenFlow controller firewalls
Some OpenFlow controller frameworks include some firewall functionality. One exam-
ple is the Floodlight OpenFlow controller [69], which has a component currently under
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development that implements ACL functionality and exposes a Representational State
Transfer (REST) Application Program Interface (API) for applications to configure fil-
tering policy on an OpenFlow switch. In effect, this work performs translation from
firewall-like rules into flow specifications. This follows a trend which has the traditional
interfaces for network management and configuration (such as Simple Network Man-
agement Protocol (SNMP)) being substituted with popular and light-weight Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP)-based APIs.
Thimble [72] is an OpenFlow controller that improves the management of ACLs
specifically for implementations of the science demilitarised zone (DMZ) architecture. A
web-based interface is presented to IT support staff to conveniently and systematically
add and remove rules that protect the HPC infrastructure located within the DMZ
network. Russell [72] also proposes the application of a “default flow” rule that directs
traffic not specifically permitted to be switched into the science DMZ to an existing
enterprise firewall. Prasad et al. [12] extend the stateless bypass switching in a science
DMZ with a policy controlled by application layer gatekeeper middleware.
Due to the lack of stateful connection tracking, neither of these approaches are com-
parable with the state-of-the-art stateful firewalls.
Shieha [74] modified the layer-2 Media Access Control (MAC) learning switch in-
cluded in POX, adding a stateful firewall module capable of blocking connections on a
five-tuple protocol/address/port basis, or application identification by means of simplis-
tic3 string matching. Firewall policy is loaded into the controller’s memory from a text
file and evaluated as new flows are established. Flow tracking is performed as packet-
in messages are received. The performance limitation of this approach is described in
section 2.7.4.
2.8.2 OpenFlow hybrid firewalls
We make a distinction between the use of the controller to track connection states
directly (as described in the preceding section) and an OpenFlow controller managing
the flow of packets between distinct slow and fast paths. The primary difference in these
strategies is that the individual components of the latter (hybrid) approach are known
to have specific performance strengths, whereas the literature raises scalability concerns
with the former.
SciPass [5] implements a secure science DMZ using OpenFlow switching controlled by
an intrusion detection system. This approach allows for the use of a traditional firewall
as the default traffic path, with the ability to accelerate connections identified by the
3Each packet is searched individually, without TCP stream reassembly.
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IDS (based on traffic mirrored by the switch) as known-good or trusted connections.
The use of OpenFlow instead of custom hardware, and the option of firewall bypass,
differentiates SciPass from the original shunting work [31].
The separation of the firewall from the shunting policy is natural in SciPass, since
IDS signatures are conceptually different from a packet filter set. We expect this design
to be well suited to environments already familiar with, and capable of operating and
maintaining, intrusion detection systems.
SciPass also has a particularly useful scalability feature: the intrusion detection traffic
can be load-balanced among nodes of an IDS cluster. This load-balancing is performed
by the OpenFlow switch.
Narisetty [58] describes vArmour, a Floodlight-based OpenFlow controller applica-
tion offering distributed firewall capability. vArmour appears to implement the shunting
approach (described as steering). Unfortunately, with the focus of the study being the
timing of session off-loading, the details of the vArmour firewall design and the mecha-
nism of its interaction with the controller are not provided. We note that vArmour is
proprietary technology, whereas SciPass is FOSS.
In the chapters that follow, we study our own approach to the design of a hybrid
OpenFlow firewall. Our prototype shares some similarities with SciPass (apart from
the shared objective to enable FDT), but differs in the way that the firewall policy and
shunting decisions interact.
2.9 Netfilter - the Linux firewall
Netfilter is Linux’s software firewall and is used in our research as the slow-path compo-
nent of a hybrid system. In this section we describe the structure and function, as well
as configuration, of Netfilter.
2.9.1 Netfilter’s design
Figure 2.5 indicates the logical flow of Linux packet processing, including Netfilter com-
ponents. Architecturally, Netfilter is composed of user-space utilities, common compo-
nents in the Linux kernel, and loadable kernel modules that implement specific firewall
functions. Figure 2.6 shows the structure of Netfilter.
2.9
.
N
E
T
F
IL
T
E
R
-
T
H
E
L
IN
U
X
F
IR
E
W
A
L
L
27
Figure 2.5: Linux Netfilter packet flow diagram (from J. Engelhardt [27])
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2.9.2 iptables configuration
For Internet Protocol (IP) version 4, the iptables utility is primarily used to config-
ure Netfilter firewall rules. Our prototype firewall also uses the conntrack command
to interface with Netfilter’s connection tracking system (described at the end of this
section).
Netfilter rules must belong to a chain and a table. Conceptually, the chain evaluated
is determined by the path of a packet through the network stack (shown in figure 2.5).
The sequence of Netfilter chains and rules applied to each packet is called traversal.
Any packet (whether bridged or routed) is first checked against the PREROUTING
chain. Once a routing or bridging decision determines whether to send the packet to the
host’s transport layer, or to forward the packet, it is either checked against INPUT chain
or FORWARD chain rules. Packets originating from the host’s transport layer are checked
by OUTPUT chain rules, and forwarded packets are finally checked by POSTROUTING
chain rules, prior to being sent to the output network interface.
In each Netfilter chain, rules belong to tables according to the function (or action)
of the rule. The PREROUTING chain has raw, mangle and nat tables; FORWARD has
mangle and filter; and POSTROUTING has mangle and nat tables.
Similar to OpenFlow flow specifications, iptables rules contain matches and ac-
tions. Netfilter includes a myriad of match types, ranging from the input or output
interface, to full application layer inspection. Actions (specified with the -J parame-
ter) can accept or discard a packet, or perform some other state-altering action (such as
marking the packet, re-writing a header, or jumping to a different set of rules to continue
evaluation).
2.9.3 Netfilter connection tracking
Conntrack enables stateful packet inspection in Netfilter. It does this by first identifying
the establishment of connections, and then allocating data structures used to track the
expected state of each connection, matching each packet against this state and (when
appropriate) updating those states based on already validated packet headers.
States associated with each transport layer connection tracked by Conntrack are:
• NEW: initial packets have been received but the firewall has not yet seen bi-directional
communication (for example, by completion of a 3-way TCP handshake).
• ESTABLISHED: the connection is established and the application-layer payload is
now transported in the packets.
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• RELATED: state applied to packets of a connection that have been determined to be
related to another connection through application-layer inspection (for example:
the data connection of an FTP session is related to its control connection).
• INVALID: applied to any packet that Netfilter cannot otherwise track (including
via the NEW state).
• UNTRACKED: a state given to packets for which connection tracking is disabled by
instruction of a firewall rule.
2.10 Traffic generation and testing
With the performance focus of FDT and our objective to improve on the performance
of existing firewall architectures, the ability to evaluate network performance is central
to the research. In this section we review approaches to network performance testing.
2.10.1 Test standards
Techniques for benchmarking network elements are of interest to both suppliers who
wish to market their products and end-users who wish to evaluate the performance of
products against their own requirements, as well as for comparison amongst competitors.
For this reason, a number of standards and methodologies exist:
1. IETF (RFC) standards for benchmarking of “Network Interconnect Devices”:
RFC1242 [10] and RFC2544 [11].
2. IETF (RFC) standards specific to the benchmarking of firewalls: RFC2647 [60]
and RFC3511 [37].
3. Test methodologies developed by network test equipment manufacturers: e.g.,
BreakingPoint firewall testing methodology.
4. Test methodologies developed by independent test houses: e.g., NSS Labs firewall
testing methodology [62].
These standards and methodologies define aspects such as terminology for the com-
ponents in test setups, but also of particular interest to our research, the profile of test
traffic generated for the purpose of evaluating performance.
One important factor during testing is the distribution of packet sizes, as this has
a direct impact on the packet rate for a given data rate. As described in section 2.3,
processor-based forwarding performance may suffer at high packet rates.
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Another aspect of performance of specific relevance to devices that track connection
state is the composition of the test traffic grouped by transport layer header values.
Firewall test methodologies are designed to demonstrate the scalability of the device
under test in this dimension, and therefore seek to discover the maximum number of
concurrent connections supported, as well as the maximum rate at which the firewall
can track the establishment of new connections.
When measuring the absolute throughput supported (in bits per second), careful
attention is given to ensuring traffic used in this test consists of a large number of
concurrent connections (often tens or hundreds of thousands), presumably because this
reflects a worst-case scenario for flow state tracking. Unfortunately, none of the standards
and methodologies included above specify a test designed to determine the maximum
throughput achievable for a single or a small number of connections (typical of FDT
applications).
2.10.2 Generating network traffic
Standards for benchmarking network equipment listed in section 2.10.1 require the prop-
erties of network traffic used during testing to be reported, but avoid dictating the
method to be used for generating traffic. This section examines some test traffic gener-
ation techniques that have been employed:
2.10.3 Sampling real traffic
The simplest approach to network traffic generation is to capture traffic in a real network
environment that the test is meant to replicate, and then to replay that traffic during
experimental runs. Alternatively, live network traffic can be safely copied (mirrored)
and used as an input into the system to be evaluated. An example of this technique
specifically relevant to our work is found in the evaluation of shunting [31], where the
classification of flows is demonstrated.
An advantage of this approach is the accuracy obtained by the use of real traffic,
which might otherwise be very difficult to synthesise due to the complexity of behaviour
of different implementations of protocols and applications, as well as the challenge of
simulating the human (end-user) influence on traffic patterns [28].
While it is possible (given sufficient hardware resources) for bi-directional network
traffic to be captured and replayed with accurate timing and without packet loss [28],
the scope of the testing possible is limited to passive applications that do not influence
the traffic flow. For example, if the device under test was to prevent forwarding of a
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packet in the original captured traffic, this would invalidate the state of transport and
application layer processes associated with that packet.
2.10.4 Simulating the network layer
If the objective of network testing is to measure the performance of a device functioning
at the network layer (such as a router), then the task of generating test traffic need only
take into account those attributes relevant to layer three functions (e.g., packet size,
protocol, addresses, etc.). In this case, replaying captured traffic is a valid (albeit not
very flexible) approach.
Many traffic generation tools (hardware and software) exist. One such tool is Har-
poon [76], which is capable of synthesising UDP and TCP flows with a specified set of
attributes (including protocol, timing, length and data attributes).
2.10.5 Simulating the application layer
In order to generate test network traffic in an experiment that aims to measure the
influence of the network on applications, it is necessary to reproduce (or simulate) the
data transmission and reception behaviour of both the application and transport layers.
The need to test the performance of network applications specifically has led to
the development of many different load-testing applications. One such tool, SURGE
[6], attempts to generate representative Web workloads in order to test HTTP proxies,
servers and the underlying layers (such as the network itself).
2.11 Conclusion
The simplifying principle of Internet routing is that intermediate nodes can forward
packets independently of the applications using the network. To control packet routing
(the network layer) based on transport layer state violates the design principle of sepa-
rating network protocols into independent layers, but this is precisely what is required
to perform flexible, connection state-dependent network filtering.
In this chapter, we have seen how the complexity of routing and filtering influences the
speed at which it can be done given state of the art hardware. Previous work has shown
how the shunting strategy can be an effective means to improve overall performance, if
network flows can be classified into those that require filtering and those that don’t.
The emergence of standardised software interfaces to control the forwarding plane
of high performance hardware routers (such as OpenFlow) presents an opportunity to
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address complex security requirements with a system composed of simpler components.
The chapters that follow explore this opportunity.
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Chapter 3
An SDN-based shunting firewall
In this chapter we define our research objectives, and document the methodology we
used to construct and evaluate our prototype SDN-based shunting firewall. We justify
high level design choices, and then describe the design and implementation of NFShunt
in detail.
3.1 Research question
In order to leverage the investment in high capacity networks, researchers must be able
to use existing, convenient tools and work-flows to move large quantities of data quickly.
The designers of network security measures at institutions (connected to research net-
works) that must deliver on this requirement, should not need to accept a radical depar-
ture from currently accepted best-practice designs used in other domains of networking.
Previous work with OpenFlow in this context has applied it to the management of
(stateless) access control lists, and the implementations of shunting used intrusion detec-
tion for stateful bypass in the science demilitarised zone (DMZ) design (see section 2.8).
In our research, we studied the use of OpenFlow to implement a shunting firewall
that provides loss-free network paths for permitted large data transfers (similar to the
science DMZ), but allows the use of stateful firewalling for all other traffic by default.
Application of this configuration of technologies to stateful firewalls is novel.
The primary problem is to develop a firewall architecture that meets the
performance requirements of data-intensive science.
Additional goals of the research were to explore the following questions:
1. How can generic and standardised off-the-shelf components be composed to create
a high performance (hybrid) firewall?
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2. What is the packet-loss performance of a hybrid firewall (is it equivalent to a “clean
network path”)?
3. How would a hybrid Software Defined Networking (SDN)-based shunting firewall
compare to a traditional firewall in terms of price-performance ratio?
4. What are the operational and maintenance benefits and drawbacks of a hybrid
firewall?
3.2 Research approach
The following approach was used in the research:
1. An SDN-based hybrid (shunting) firewall was designed. This design was required to
be practical to implement and offer significant improvements over existing designs.
2. A prototype firewall (NFShunt) was constructed based on the SDN hybrid design
to demonstrate its feasibility.
3. The performance of NFShunt was compared to that of a representative traditional
hardware firewall, and both systems were evaluated for their suitability in Fast
Data Transfer (FDT) scenarios. The experiment described in section 4.1 was
designed to perform this evaluation.
4. An analysis of the experimental results, as well as other performance metrics such
as cost, complexity and flexibility, was performed and documented in sufficient
detail to allow the conclusions of the research to inform decision making in real-
world applications.
3.3 Prototype architecture
NFShunt is a layer 2 (transparent) firewall composed of two interconnected components,
as illustrated in figure 3.1.
The shunting controller and the slow-path are co-located on the same physical server,
while the OpenFlow switch provides external interfaces and performs hardware bypass-
switching. The slow-path is based on the Linux kernel’s built-in Ethernet bridging
function, combined with Netfilter (the standard Linux firewall).
Each Linux Ethernet bridge port is physically connected to a corresponding “slow”
port on the OpenFlow switch. One-to-one mapping between external (network) facing
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Figure 3.1: NFShunt architecture
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ports and “slow” ports is statically configured during the installation of the firewall.
Communication between the shunting controller and the OpenFlow agent is also config-
ured during the prototype’s setup.
No packets are forwarded by the OpenFlow switch until it receives programming from
the shunting controller at run-time. When the controller starts, it installs low priority
flow specifications that direct all non-shunted packets via the Linux Ethernet bridge.
These flow table entries remain for the execution of the prototype.
Per-connection flow entries are installed dynamically during run-time to implement
the firewall’s bypass shunting according to iptables firewall policy. These entries are
removed by the switch, a configurable number of seconds after the last packet matching
the flow specification for the connection is switched.
3.4 Design choices
The hybrid design, based on bypass switching combined with a flexible software firewall,
was chosen to address the primary research problem of enabling loss-free stateful for-
warding suited to the performance requirements of data intensive research. In chapter
two, we explored the strengths and weaknesses of both pure-software and ACL-based
packet filters. Our design finds a compromise between the two, and consequently inherits
at least some of their weaknesses. Once trusted connections are bypass-switched, the
prototype is no longer able to detect security policy violations (e.g., through application
layer inspection) due to the stateless packet forwarding performed in hardware. We note
that, unlike ACL filters in science DMZs, the hybrid design allows for stateful tracking
of connection establishment. Similar to ACLs and the original shunting work, the argu-
ment applies that packets that comprise the data-transfer portion of the connection are
often encrypted, and therefore inspecting them offers limited value.
3.4.1 The toolkit approach
Unlike previous work that built hybrid firewalls with custom or proprietary compo-
nents, our research followed a toolkit approach: NFShunt is (and is based on) Free and
Open Source Software (FOSS) combined with standardised Commercial Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) hardware components. The primary enabler of this is the adoption of OpenFlow
by switch manufacturers. While this implies that some assembly is required, thereby in-
creasing the initial complexity of installing and configuring multiple components, we
hypothesise that it could offer cost savings and other operational benefits.
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3.4.2 Transparent firewall
We chose to implement a transparent (bump-in-the-wire) firewall. This simplified the
work significantly by avoiding re-implementation of layer 3 routing semantics in the fast-
path. While this choice limits the flexibility of NFShunt’s deployment in diverse network
environments, a transparent firewall is much easier to add into an existing network design
since it requires no layer 3 changes.
3.4.3 Linux Ethernet bridge and Netfilter
The lack of integration with Netfilter excluded alternatives to the built-in Linux ker-
nel bridge function (such as open vSwitch (OVS) and Data Plane Development Kit
(DPDK)). Due to its mature implementation and widespread use, the Linux bridge is a
simple and reasonably performant choice for the slow forwarding path. The ability to
monitor and manipulate Netfilter’s connection tracking directly makes it the ideal choice
for a hybrid firewall design.
3.4.4 Integrated firewall and shunting policy
The objective of designing a firewall required the mechanism for expressing shunting
policy to be coherent with the traditional firewall ruleset. We explored mechanisms
to annotate Netfilter Conntrack objects with shunting policy expressed through iptables
rules. While this adds complexity in the design, it is closer to what firewall administrators
would expect from a traditional firewall.
3.5 Low-level design
NFShunt was implemented in Python based on the POX OpenFlow controller library.
The slow-path forwarding plane is a Linux 3.2.0 kernel bridge, while the fast-path (an
OpenFlow Ethernet switch) is used for all external connections.
The prototype makes use of a Pica8 P-3290 top-of-rack Ethernet switch (based on a
Broadcom switch Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) and customised OVS
as the OpenFlow agent). The switch is equipped with 48 1000Base-T and four 10GBase
SFP+ ports. For the prototype firewall slow-path, we used a fit-PC3 Pro with four Intel
82574L-based 1000Base-T Ethernet NICs connected to the switch.
NFShunt’s implementation is structured in five modules:
1. The controller core logic triggers by-passing of flows based on input from the
configuration and slow-path interface.
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2. The slow-path interface processes Netfilter connection tracking events.
3. The fast-path interface communicates with the OpenFlow switch.
4. The configuration interface adapts NFshunt to the instance-specific details of
the network and firewall policy.
5. The logging interface caters for troubleshooting and performance monitoring of
the prototype.
The remainder of this chapter describes manual configuration required for the pro-
totype to function, as well as the design and implementation of each module. We start
with the interface modules and conclude with a description of the core logic, which ties
together all the functions of NFShunt.
3.5.1 Fast path configuration
Some basic configuration of the OpenFlow switch (the fast path) is required for the
shunting prototype. In addition to the OpenFlow protocol itself, the Open Networking
Foundation has defined a standard protocol (OF-CONFIG) to allow remote (and poten-
tially automated) configuration of OpenFlow switches. It is therefore possible for the
prototype to add the necessary configuration to the switch based on the information al-
ready available from the configuration module. Unfortunately, the firmware of the Pica8
switch available during development of the prototype did not support OF-CONFIG.
Manual configuration of the Pica8 switch was therefore necessary, and OVS com-
mands were used for this purpose.
Configuring the prototype with OVS commands
The first step is to create an OVS bridge instance with an associated controller (192.0.2.1:6633
is the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) endpoint of the shunting controller):
ovs-vsctl add-br br0 -- set bridge br0 datapath_type=pica8
ovs-vsctl set-controller br0 tcp:192.0.2.1:6633
The intent of the prototype is for all forwarding to be under the control of the slow
path. When the control connection fails, the OVS bridge instance should not revert
to any default behaviour (such layer 2 switching), since this would not be secure. The
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bridge is therefore configured not to forward frames unless explicitly programmed to do
so by the controller:
ovs-vsctl set-fail-mode br0 secure
Next, two slow path ports and two fast path ports are added into the bridge. The
slow and fast path ports are matched by the slow path configuration, as described in the
next section. In this example, two 1000Base-Ethernet ports (10 and 11) are used for the
slow path, and two 10GBase-Ethernet ports (49 and 50) are used for the fast path:
ovs-vsctl add-port br0 ge-1/1/10 -- set Interface ge-1/1/10 type=pica8
ovs-vsctl add-port br0 ge-1/1/11 -- set Interface ge-1/1/11 type=pica8
ovs-vsctl add-port br0 te-1/1/49 -- set Interface te-1/1/49 type=pica8
ovs-vsctl add-port br0 te-1/1/50 -- set Interface te-1/1/50 type=pica8
With the above configuration, the switch will attempt periodically to establish a
connection to the shunting controller and, when it does, it will receive flow configuration
to switch frames between the fast path ports via the slow path. This configuration is
persistently stored in the OVS configuration database of the switch’s OpenFlow agent,
therefore the fast path configuration only needs to be performed once (during installation
of the firewall).
3.5.2 Slow path configuration
The controller communicates with Netfilter via the user-space interface (Netlink) of
Netfilter’s connection-tracking module (Conntrack).
The operation of the prototype requires specific configuration of Netfilter using the
iptables command line utility. These configurations ensure that information about
TCP flows present in the Linux kernel (due to the fact that packets associated with those
TCP flows are seen by the slow path in the kernel) are made available to the shunting
controller.
iptables configuration for NFShunt
Transport layer connections are automatically tracked by Netfilter once the Conntrack
kernel module is loaded:
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Figure 3.2: Connection mark bit fields used by NFShunt
modprobe ip_conntrack
Since NFShunt functions as a transparent (layer 2) firewall, it is also necessary to
ensure that Netfilter is configured to inspect bridged packets (in addition to routed
packets) passing through the Linux kernel. This is the default configuration on most
Linux systems, but it can be explicitly configured as follows:
sysctl -w net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables=1
Since the system administrator is expected to configure the default slow-path firewall
policy as a set of Netfilter rules, NFShunt was designed to integrate the expression of
shunting policy into the same rule-set. This is achieved through the use of Netfilter’s
packet mark and connection mark modules.
The mark extensions define both matching extensions and rule targets. The packet
mark extension permits the administrator to assign any 32-bit value to a special field in
the data structure associated with each packet processed by the Linux kernel (using the
mark target). This value can be read by other rules using the packet match extension,
and can also be accessed by the connection mark extension, which enables marking of
connections identified by the Conntrack module.
In order to permit the administrator to continue using the mark extensions for other
purposes, the prototype uses only the 16 most significant bits of the mark value, and
masks each operation to leave the lower 16 bits unmodified.
The prototype uses mark bits to store the required shunting action (in the flowmark
field), as well as flags and information about the flow’s ingress and egress kernel bridge
physical ports (in the pd-in and pd-out fields). Figure 3.2 documents the layout of
the 32-bit mark field.
Only the packet marking target is required for the rules that express shunting policy:
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Three configurable values are defined to express the various supported shunting ac-
tions: ignore (to do nothing with the connection), shunt (to bypass the connection via
the fast path), and block (to install a rule to drop the connection in the fast path). This
value must be encoded into the 4 bits from bit 16 to bit 19 (allowing for expansion of
the prototype’s actions to 16).
While the generic (logical) flow of matching on, and applying actions to, packets in
the slow-path is described in section 2.9, the logic employed for the prototype is further
described as a flow diagram in figure 3.3. The dotted lines indicate the link between
actions encoding information in PREROUTING which is later matched in POSTROUTING.
4
4
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
3.
A
N
S
D
N
-B
A
S
E
D
S
H
U
N
T
IN
G
F
IR
E
W
A
L
L
Yes
No
No
PRERO
UTING Is physdev_in a slow path interface?
Restore
connmark
Physdev in is
interface1
Is physdev_in
encoded in mark?
Physdev in is
interfaceN
...
Encode interface1
in mark
Encode interfaceN
in mark
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
NoIngress
POSTR
OUTING Is packet bridged?
Is physdev_in
encoded in mark?
physdev_out is
interface1
Is physdev_out
encoded in mark?
physdev_out is
interfaceN
...
Encode interface1
in mark
Encode interfaceN
in mark
Save connmark
Encode mark for shunt,
Ignore or block
...
Yes
Yes Yes
Yes
Arbitrary matchN?
No
Arbitrary match1?
Yes
No
Is a flow flag set?
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Bridging 
decision is 
made
Egress
No
.
Start Yes
Start
Yes
Figure 3.3: NFShunt Netfilter rule flow diagram
3.5. LOW-LEVEL DESIGN 45
NFShunt makes use of the mangle table in the PREROUTING and POSTROUTING
chains to mark both packets and connections for the purpose of shunting. In order
to simplify integration with an existing iptables rule-set, a dedicated chain is used
for shunting policy rules (NFSHUNT POLICY), which is indirectly evaluated from the
POSTROUTING chain. An example rule follows:
iptables -t mangle -A NFSHUNT_POLICY -p tcp --dport 5000
-m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j MARK
--set-xmark 0x10010000/0x100f0000
The above rule sets a value of 1 (defined in the default controller configuration to
trigger a shunt) when a TCP flow is matched with destination port 5000.
We now describe the rules necessary for the functioning of the prototype (in addition
to shunting policy):
Netfilter’s rule traversal is directed from the built-in PREROUTING chain of the man-
gle table to a chain defined for the prototype’s pre-routing rules: NFSHUNT PRE:
iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -j NFSHUNT_PRE
The first rule in NFSHUNT PRE copies the connection mark from the connection
tracking object associated with the packet being inspected (if one exists) to the packet
mark (the restore operation):
iptables -t mangle -A NFSHUNT_PRE -j CONNMARK --restore-mark
In order to match the correct fast-path ports to the slow-path ports on which the
connection enters and exits the prototype prior to shunting, it is also necessary to encode
the slow path bridge input and output interfaces into the mark. This is done in two
stages (before and after the kernel’s bridging decision).
A rule checks bit 30 of the mark value (part of the flag field), to determine whether the
input interface has already been recorded in the mark. If not, it directs rule traversal
to the NFSHUNT PRE PD IN chain, which has one rule to match every possible input
interface. These rules alter the mark value at bits 24 to 27 to a value unique to that
interface (also configured in the shunting controller), as well as setting the flag checked
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by the previous rule. In the example rules below, the interface p1p1 corresponds to a
mark of 1, and p1p2 to a mark of 2:
iptables -t mangle -A NFSHUNT_PRE_PD_IN -m physdev --physdev-in p1p1
-j MARK --set-xmark 0x41000000/0x4f000000
iptables -t mangle -A NFSHUNT_PRE_PD_IN -m physdev --physdev-in p1p2
-j MARK --set-xmark 0x42000000/0x4f000000
Rule traversal then returns to the default Netfilter tables and chains, in which the
administrator may have defined any other firewall configuration. Once this reaches the
POSTROUTING chain for the mangle table, another rule again directs traversal to a chain
defined for prototype’s use, NFSHUNT POST, which contains three rules. The first again
checks a flag at bit 29 of the mark value to test whether the output interface is recorded,
and if not, directs traversal to the NFSHUNT POST PD OUT chain which marks bits 20
to 23:
iptables -t mangle -A NFSHUNT_POST_PD_OUT -m physdev
--physdev-is-bridged --physdev-out p1p1 -j MARK
--set-xmark 0x20100000/0x20f00000
iptables -t mangle -A NFSHUNT_POST_PD_OUT -m physdev
--physdev-is-bridged --physdev-out p1p2 -j MARK
--set-xmark 0x20200000/0x20f00000
In this case, it is necessary to include a check to discriminate bridged from routed
packets, due to the design of Netfilter’s logic (hence the use of --physdev-is-bridged).
Next, NFSHUNT POST directs evaluation to the NFSHUNT POLICY chain described
above, and finally it copies the mark from the packet back to the connection tracking
mark (the save operation):
iptables -t mangle -A NFSHUNT_POST -j CONNMARK --save-mark
3.6 Prototype controller implementation
3.6.1 Slow path interface
Interaction with Conntrack is via the conntrack user-space utility. The shunting
controller starts an instance of conntrack with the -E parameter inside a thread, and
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then reads a sequence of connection tracking events from the standard output stream in
Extensible Markup Language (XML) format.
Connection tracking events describe the creation, destruction or modification of con-
nection tracking objects in the kernel. When an event includes the mark attribute (ob-
tained from the iptables connection mark), the controller examines it in further detail.
Certain events are ignored as they cannot be used to trigger shunting. These include de-
struction or modification events where the state of the TCP flow changes to FIN WAIT,
LAST ACK or TIME WAIT. If the flow is not ignored, and it contains the necessary layer
4 header information (TCP ports), the controller checks for the presence of a matching
action in the flow mark.
The flags, flow mark and information about the slow path physical input and output
interfaces are used by the controller’s core logic to make shunting decisions.
In addition to monitoring connection tracking events, the controller core must also
be able to delete connection tracking objects for flows that have been shunted or blocked.
This is achieved by executing the conntrack utility with the -D parameter and speci-
fying the 5-tuple describing the TCP connection.
3.6.2 Fast path interface
Interaction with the fast path is via the POX OpenFlow controller framework. The
prototype itself is implemented as a module within the framework; so while, from the
point of view of the design, OpenFlow is a module, the implementation calls POX
functions directly from the core logic of the prototype.
Upon start-up, POX listens for connections from OpenFlow switches on the default
TCP port for this protocol. The fast-path switch is configured with the IP address of
the out-of-band connection to the slow path server (where the controller runs). When
the switch connects to the controller, a connection handler runs which performs the
following actions:
1. If the controller is configured to delete existing flow entries, it does so by sending
a flow modification to the switch. This allows the prototype to begin managing
the fast path with a known state.
2. If the default packet flow is configured via the slow path (default no shunting),
then the controller iterates through the port groups specified in the configuration
file, and sends two flow modifications to add flows between the slow and fast path
ports (one flow per direction). This is equivalent to logical patching between the
slow and fast path ports.
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Bridgestart
ShuntController adds flow entry
Flow entry times out
Figure 3.4: Per-connection state machine of the forwarding path
3. A thread handling the slow-path interface is started.
Additional event handlers generate logging entries for flow statistics, flow removal
events and connection tear-down.
The core logic of the controller calls POX functions directly to add flow-entries for
shunting and blocking.
3.6.3 Controller core logic
The core of the shunting controller receives events from the slow-path module, which
have been validated to contain the meta-data added by the Netfilter rules configured for
the functioning of the prototype.
If the action indicated by the flow mark is to shunt, the controller will add two flow
specifications (one for each direction of the flow) via the fast-path interface to by-pass
the slow-path. These flow specifications include layer 2, 3 and 4 header match fields, an
action to output via the corresponding fast path ports, and the configured idle time-out.
For blocking actions, the only difference in the specification is that the output action is
omitted (which leads to an implicit packet drop).
Finally, the controller includes the instruction for the switch to inform the controller
when flows are deleted (for informational purposes), and each flow is annotated (in the
switch) with a cookie value that corresponds to the connection tracking object ID from
the slow path that triggered the shunting action.
The state of the fast path, therefore, transitions between shunting or blocking and
forwarding packets via the slow-path. Figure 3.4 illustrates how flow entry programming
and time-out transition between the two states on a per-connection basis.
After a shunt or block is installed, the connection tracking object is deleted via the
slow-path interface. The reason for this is three-fold:
1. Since the slow-path will no longer forward packets for the flow, the connection
tracking object serves no purpose for Netfilter, hence deleting it frees up valuable
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kernel memory.
2. If a flow stalls for longer than the idle-timeout of the flow specifications imple-
menting the shunt, and then resumes, subsequent packets will re-appear on the
slow path. At this point, it is necessary for the controller to re-install the shunt,
but the state of the connection tracking will not necessarily change in a manner
that will trigger an event visible via the slow-path interface. Deleting the entry
forces the slow-path to re-create the entry, which is guaranteed to be visible to the
controller.
3. If the Linux kernel is configured to be strict in the stateful tracking of TCP sequence
numbers, the shunting action will result in the connection tracking object’s state
being invalid once the connection proceeds via the fast path. In this scenario, if
a connection-resumption is attempted (as described above), then Netfilter could
terminate the connection.
3.6.4 Configuration module
Installation-specific information is provided by the configuration module. This func-
tionality is implemented by reading a single text configuration file at start-up of the
controller. The location of the configuration file can be specified as a command-line
parameter during start-up of the controller:
sudo ./pox.py nfshunt --configurationfile /path/to/file.json
If not specified, the controller will attempt to open a file named nfshunt.json
in the current directory when the controller is started. Note that the shunting con-
troller must run with root privileges to access and modify Netfilter connection tracking
information (thus the use of the sudo command).
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) was chosen as the configuration file syntax, as
it is both simple for administrators to read and write, and it supports nested structures.
The standard Python library’s built in-support for JSON parsing simplifies the code and
reduces dependencies.
The following general configuration parameters are available:
• delete flows on startup (default is true): causes the controller to clear the
fast path flow table on start-up.
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• delete flows on shutdown (default is true): same as above, but runs at shut-
down.
• default shunt timeout (default is 10 seconds): sets the idle timeout for shunt
flow entries. Making this longer increases the flow table contention, but reduces
the load on the controller for connections that stall.
• default block timeout (default is 10 seconds): same as above, but specifically
for block actions (as opposed to shunt actions).
• default no shunting (default is true): if this is true, then the controller will
configure flows to send traffic via the slow path by default (at start-up), and the
ignore action does nothing (hence ignored flows will continue via the slow path).
Setting this to false only makes sense if delete flows on startup is false, and
the fast path is pre-programmed for some useful forwarding action.
Two nested sections must exist in the configuration file:
1. ports defines a list of groups that tie together three parameters:
(a) The fast port on the OpenFlow switch: the port that connects to the net-
work.
(b) The slow port on the OpenFlow switch connecting to the bridge interface
on the slow path to be used for traffic to and from the fast port.
(c) physdevin is the unique number configured in the iptables rules for marking
of traffic entering via the bridge interface on the slow path, to be used for
traffic to and from the fast port.
2. mark actions maps numbers configured in the iptables rules for marking flows
for the corresponding actions of shunting, blocking and ignoring.
3.6.5 Logging module
Logging information generated by the shunting controller is intended to be used in one of
two modes: by default, the logging level provides messages that would be of interest to
an administrator. If the log level is set to DEBUG for the NFShunt POX component (by
appending log.level --nfshunt=DEBUG to the command line parameters), extra
messages will be emitted:
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• Information about flow events from Netfilter Conntrack that are ignored as they
are deemed irrelevant.
• Flow statistics dumped from the fast-path after each flow programming action.
In addition to troubleshooting, the intent of the DEBUG logging mode is to output
information about the functioning of the controller that will be recorded for the purpose
of evaluating its performance as part of the research.
Additional logging behaviour can be configured by making use of POX’s built in
capabilities. Examples of this would be to change the logging prefix format by appending
additional command line parameters:
log --format="[%(asctime)s] %(module)s %(levelname)s %(message)s"
Or redirection of log messages to a file:
log --file=nfshunt-pox.log
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we defined research questions and a research approach that required
the construction of a prototype hybrid firewall. The design, implementation and con-
figuration of our prototype was described in detail. In the next chapter, we proceed to
evaluate our design through experimentation.
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Chapter 4
Experimentation
In the previous chapter, we outlined our research approach and described the construc-
tion of the NFshunt. However, this alone does not answer the research questions posed
in section 3.1. In this chapter, we describe our experimental methodology and report
the results of the experiments.
We proceeded to evaluate our prototype’s performance, firstly to determine if the
implementation works correctly (validating the design’s feasibility), and whether it is
suitable for the Fast Data Transfer (FDT) use-cases normally catered for by science
demilitarised zone (DMZ)s.
Experiments were designed to compare the prototype’s network performance to that
of a high speed firewall employing a traditional design. We ensured that our experiments
would produce the data required for our analysis (which, in turn, addresses our research
questions), by mapping out our research approach in Table 4.1.
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Research question Data required Experimental method Analysis
1 How can generic and stan-
dardised off-the-shelf compo-
nents be composed to create
a high performance (hybrid)
firewall?
Evidence that the
shunting mechanism
works in an implemen-
tation of the design.
Implement the prototype
and test the shunting
mechanism with generated
network connections.
If Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) connec-
tions can be tracked by
Netfilter during establish-
ment, and then be off-
loaded to the OpenFlow
switch, the design is vali-
dated.
2 What is the packet-loss per-
formance of a hybrid firewall
(is it equivalent to a clean net-
work path?)
Packet loss rates for
both the prototype and
an environment similar
to the science DMZ.
Generate FDT-like load,
and measure packet loss for
both the prototype and a
direct-switching configura-
tion.
Test the hypothesis that
the packet loss of the
prototype is equivalent to
direct-switching.
3
How would a hybrid
Software Defined
Networking
(SDN)-based shunting
firewall compare to a
traditional firewall in
terms of
price-performance
ratio?
Packet loss rates for
both the prototype and
a firewall representative
of its class.
Generate FDT-like load
and measure packet loss for
both the traditional fire-
wall and a direct-switching
configuration.
Test the hypothesis that
throughput performance of
the prototype is greater
than the traditional fire-
wall.
Estimates of cost for all
equipment components.
Implement the prototype,
then estimate total cost
based on the bill of mate-
rials.
Compare the hardware
costs, consider price/per-
formance.
4 What are the operational
and maintenance benefits and
drawbacks of a hybrid fire-
wall?
Insight into the require-
ments on an operator of
the prototype.
Document the configura-
tion, troubleshooting and
securing of the prototype
during the experiments
above.
Compare the aspects of the
prototype’s operations to
traditional firewall opera-
tions.
5 Have we developed a firewall
architecture that meets the
performance requirements of
data-intensive science?
Outcome of the analysis
for research questions 1,
2 and 3 above.
If the analysis of 1, 2 and
3 favour NFShunt, we con-
clude that the overall re-
search objective has been
met.
Table 4.1: Research approach: mapping questions to method and analysis
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4.1 Experimental methodology
The objective of the science DMZ design is to create a loss-free network path based on the
observation [22] that a firewall cannot perform loss-free forwarding for permitted TCP
connections in FDT scenarios. In our performance evaluation, we focused our attention
on the TCP performance so that we could relate the results back to the science DMZ
use-case. Replaying of captured traffic or network layer simulation were not suitable
methods for test traffic generation when evaluating TCP performance. We therefore
chose application-layer load generation, which indirectly produces network test traffic.
4.1.1 Experimental design choices
Our experiments were designed to emulate a typical data-intensive science infrastructure
scenario. Due to established best common practices for maximising network performance
with high bandwidth-delay products, the experiments evaluate approximate best-case
performance with moderately difficult circumstances. Our objective for the experiments
was an unbiased comparison, which required an upper bound to the performance tuning
that was done. We sought to achieve this balance through specific experimental design
choices:
• Focus on TCP: TCP was selected as the transport protocol for test traffic, since
the congestion control mechanism would be affected by the packet-loss performance
of the tested firewalls. TCP is also the most widely used transport protocol,
therefore the choice reflects realistic applications.
• Large packets: Jumbo frames are commonly used to reduce the packet processing
rate, and tuning this parameter in our experiment was a sensible optimisation. We
expect that smaller frames will magnify the effect that any difference in packet-loss
performance will have on the results of the comparison.
• Limited hardware tuning: the traditional firewall was tuned for single-flow
performance according to the advice of the equipment vendor (described in sub-
section 4.1.3). Since NFShunt aims to utilise generic hardware, no model-specific
tuning was performed on the slow and fast path components.
• Minimal firewall rule-set: Both firewalls were tested with the default policy.
Specifically excluding the complexity of the rule-set from the factors in the ex-
periments created a best-case scenario for both, and established a performance
baseline. While this is not realistic, we expect that a complex rule-set will favour
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the shunting design and magnify the performance difference we hypothesised (be-
cause it would increase the utilisation of CPU and bandwidth required for state
tracking – a problem that shunting avoids).
The traffic-generating servers used in the experimental setup were also tuned to
emulate a typical end-host in a science DMZ (described in sub-section 4.2.2).
These choices support the research objective of exploring the limitations of traditional
firewalls and our hybrid firewall design.
4.1.2 Lab equipment
Traffic generation (including synthetic delay) relied on two Dell Poweredge servers run-
ning Linux, each equipped with Intel 82599-based dual-port 10GBase-Ethernet Network
Interface Controllers (NICs). We used a Cisco ASA 5585 firewall for comparison to
the prototype firewall. Interface counter values on the Cisco were recorded by a script
accessing the system via the serial console instead of in-band management via the test
network (which would have complicated packet loss measurements).
4.1.3 Lab test configurations
With advice from Cisco technical support engineers, some changes were made to the
factory default configuration of the Cisco:
• ASA firewall software was upgraded to version 8.47.
• The firewalling mode was set to transparent.
• The Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) for interfaces was increased to 9216
bytes.
• “jumbo-frame reservation” was enabled.
• TCP Maximum Segment Size (MSS) clamping was disabled.
Four test configurations were used for experiments:
• Configuration one connected the test servers directly, and served to establish the
best-case throughput achievable using the experimental hardware. Our experiment
required endpoints with sufficient CPU capacity, as well as peripheral bus and
memory bus bandwidth, to support near-line rate TCP transfers. During these test
runs, Internet Protocol (IP) stack tuning was done to optimise TCP throughput
with or without synthetic delay.
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• Configuration two inserted the Cisco firewall in-line between the test servers via
one set of 10Gbase-Ethernet NIC interfaces.
• Configuration three connected the Pica8 switch via another set of 10Gbase-
Ethernet NICs, and the switch was manually configured for direct forwarding of
frames between the test servers without the slow-path interface (no shunting mech-
anism).
• Configuration four allowed the Pica8 switch to be controlled by NFShunt.
The duration of individual TCP throughout tests was 60s, which was sufficient for
TCP to reach maximum throughput even at 400ms simulated Round-Trip Time (RTT).
Configurations two through four were used for performance evaluation, which is
described in the remainder of this chapter.
4.2 Factors and levels
Round trip delay is an important factor in TCP performance. Many science applications
require a small number of high volume, long distance data transfers. For example, the
Square Kilometre Array (SKA) will require data transport from a number of African
countries to South Africa, and from Australia and South Africa to Europe and North
America. For our experiments, synthetic delay values were chosen to represent typical
round-trip times for intra-African (100ms), European-South African (200ms) and North
American-South African (400ms) connections. These are realistic for the distribution
of data from the SKA mid-frequency radio telescope to be constructed in South Africa.
Factors (and their respective levels) tested during experiment runs were:
• Selected middle-box: three configurations exist to allow the performance com-
parison objective of the experiment: direct switch, the prototype firewall (NF-
Shunt) and the traditional firewall (Cisco ASA 5585).
• Synthetic delay: since the performance reducing effect of packet loss is dramatic
in the presence of delay, it is varied (from no delay to long-distance network delays
of 100ms, 200ms and 400ms round-trip-times) to observe this effect in the test
configurations. The Linux netem [35] queue discipline was used to emulate half of
the transmit delay on each of the two test servers.
Tests for each combination of factors and levels was repeated 100 times.
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4.2.1 Measurements
The following observable performance characteristics were measured in each experiment
run:
• Absolute TCP throughput: individual as well as aggregate TCP throughput
was measured using the iperf3 network throughput testing utility [24].
• Dropped packets: packets dropped between the test endpoints were measured
by comparing NIC frame counters on the servers to the frame counters of the device
under test. This also allowed for locating the cause of the loss.
• TCP stack behaviour: Web100 [48] instrumented Linux kernels were used, and
a custom application logged snapshots of the Web100 variables associated with the
test connection every 100ms, to allow analysis of the TCP stack behaviour during
transfers.
The above measurements were annotated with events relevant to the shunting be-
haviour of the prototype firewall, in particular, the point in time when a shunting instruc-
tion is sent, and the last packet is switched on the slow-path. Network Time Protocol
was used to synchronise the system clocks of the two test servers and the slow path
server.
4.2.2 Validation of test procedure
Performance tuning was performed on the end-hosts with direct network switching con-
figured via the OpenFlow switch (in order to validate the test procedure prior to the ex-
periments). Host IP stack tuning followed conservative guidelines applicable for modern
Linux kernels (optimised to allow for round-trip delays greater than 400ms at 10 Gbit s−1
link capacities). Parameters used are listed in Table 4.2. No hardware or driver-specific
parameters were changed, as this would deviate from typical data transfer scenarios that
the experiments were intended to simulate.
The netem Linux QoS module was configured on the respective network interfaces to
introduce fixed transmit delays, which together amounted to the total desired synthetic
round-trip delay for each experimental run. It was also necessary to adjust the default
QoS buffer of 1,000 to 100,000 packets, in order to prevent packets being dropped in the
kernel transmit path.
With this configuration, the testbed was capable of consistent TCP transfers at
throughputs in excess of 9 Gbit s−1 for 0ms, 100ms and 200ms RTT (included as the direct
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Tuning parameter Value
NIC transmit queue length (txqueuelen) 10,000 packets
TCP socket buffer size auto-tuning maximum
(tcp wmem/tcp rmem)
500 MB
Network interface MTU 9,000 B
Table 4.2: Host tuning for test servers
series of performance tests in the next section). These results provided a performance
baseline and context for the experiments that followed.
4.3 Experimental results
In this subsection we report the results of our performance experiments. Mean connec-
tion shunt timing, TCP throughput and packet loss values were calculated, and then
used to test hypotheses that the performance of the systems we compared differ. We
also report the magnitude of performance differences (all of which were found to be
statistically significant).
We considered both the speed with which the prototype moves packet forwarding
between the slow and fast paths (the shunting mechanism), and the externally observable
packet forwarding performance during each test.
4.3.1 Shunting mechanism
The shunting mechanism of the prototype was profiled to determine how quickly flows
can be shunted. The timing of events were recorded for shunted TCP connections (mea-
sured in seconds elapsed since the originating test server sent the SYN packet establishing
the connection). Table 4.3 summarises the results of 100 tests for each combination of
factors. Two of the events are timestamps recorded in the shunting controller logs: the
time when the controller receives a the connection tracking event from the kernel (via
the conntrack utility) and the time when all the POX library calls to install shunting
flow specifications are executed. The third event is the time at which the last packet is
slow-switched, as recorded by a packet capture on the show path server.
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Event description Time from SYN (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
Controller detected flow mark 3.3 0.30
End of flow programming 58.0 0.69
Last packet slow-switched 75.8 0.04
Table 4.3: Shunting event performance
Synthetic RTT Test Mean data rate Gbit s−1 Mean packet loss %
None
Direct switching 9.944 –
Shunting 9.923 0.00
Cisco ASA5585 9.838 0.05
100 ms
Direct switching 9.678 –
Shunting 9.690 –
Cisco ASA5585 5.337 0.10
200 ms
Direct switching 9.332 –
Shunting 9.334 –
Cisco ASA5585 4.197 0.21
400 ms
Direct switching 5.978 –
Shunting 5.957 –
Cisco ASA5585 3.094 0.21
Table 4.4: Single flow forwarding performance
4.3.2 Forwarding performance
The results of the single-connection TCP performance tests are summarised in Table 4.4.
Throughput as measured by the iperf3 utility is reported, while the packet loss rate
is calculated by comparing transmit and receive Ethernet NIC Media Access Control
(MAC) frame counters on the test servers.
No packets were dropped in the direct series of tests, confirming that the OpenFlow
switch is capable of non-blocking line-rate switching. In tests of the prototype and the
traditional firewall (where packet loss was observed), the NIC MAC frame counters were
compared to the frame counters of the device under test to locate the cause of the loss.
Both firewalls were found to be receiving but not forwarding all frames (in other words,
unlike direct switching, both firewalls dropped some packets).
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Throughput tests on the Cisco firewall were repeated with two and four simultaneous
connections, in order to study the effects of TCP window scaling and internal load-
balancing beyond a single flow. These results are shown in Table 4.5.
Figure 4.1 shows the congestion window and TCP throughput during the first 400
milliseconds of three individual (and independent) experiment runs at 200ms RTT, for
the Cisco ASA 5585, NFShunt and direct switching tests. The circles in the congestion
window plot indicate retransmissions (each circle’s area is scaled to the log of the number
of packets retransmitted during a 100ms sample). While this figure does not summarise
the results, it provides a visual illustration of the effect packet loss has on the TCP
performance of the traditional firewall, compared to direct switching and the prototype
firewall. Shunting occurs before the first data point on the graph. We do not directly
indicate the timing of packet loss on this graph, as the data was not available from
Web100. Peaks in the sawtooth shape of the congestion window plot (for the Cisco test)
correspond to short bursts of retransmissions.
Mean data rate Gbit s−1
Flows No delay 100 ms synthetic RTT 200 ms synthetic RTT
One 9.838 5.337 4.197
Two 9.975 9.471 8.724
Four 10.011 9.866 9.430
Table 4.5: Cisco - multiple flow forwarding performance
4.3.3 Network performance comparison
We tested the hypothesis that the direct switching performance differs from the pro-
totype’s performance, and that the prototype’s performance is different to the Cisco
firewall’s performance. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was applied to mean throughput
and packet loss measurements of the respective devices at different RTT values. We
interpret that tests with p > 0.05 indicate no significant difference while those with
p < 0.05 do. Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 summarise the results.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of congestion window and throughput for three independent
test runs at 200ms RTT.
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RTT Difference in mean data rate Gbit s−1 Difference in mean packet loss %
None significant difference of 0.021 Gbit s−1 no significant difference
100 ms no significant difference identical (no loss)
200 ms no significant difference identical (no loss)
400 ms no significant difference identical (no loss)
Table 4.6: Tests of the hypothesis that direct switching and prototype performance differ
RTT Difference in mean data rate Gbit s−1 Difference in mean packet loss %
None significant difference of 0.084 Gbit s−1 significant difference of 0.051%
100 ms significant difference of 4.353 Gbit s−1 significant difference of 0.096%
200 ms significant difference of 5.137 Gbit s−1 significant difference of 0.207%
400 ms significant difference of 2.863 Gbit s−1 significant difference of 0.209%
Table 4.7: Tests of the hypothesis that prototype and Cisco ASA 5585 performance differ
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Chapter 5
Discussion
In this chapter, we analyse our prototype implementation and experimental evaluation
results, with the purpose of answering the research questions posed in section 3.1 and
mapped to our research methodology in table 4.1.
5.1 Analysis of the prototype implementation
We consider the feasibility of the implementation in order to provide the analysis required
to answer research question one in table 4.1:
Our experimental results show that controlling a shunting mechanism using the Net-
filter firewall rule-set works, but we identified some shortcomings of this approach.
The use of connection marking to specify actions makes for a complicated iptables
rule-set, and imposes structure that may require existing firewall policy to be re-written
by the administrator. A more elegant implementation would add a new iptables action
type to Netfilter, allowing rules to be written in the following style (a rule to trigger
hardware bypass SSH connections once they are established):
iptables -F FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -m tcp
--dport 22 -j HARDWARE --hardware-action=bypass
This would require the development of a kernel module – a non-trivial undertaking for
a user-interface improvement!
We found attempting to integrate the POX controller with connection tracking via
the user-space Netlink libraries difficult, due to poor Python bindings for the Netlink
connection tracking protocol. Instead, our implementation spawns the conntrack
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userspace tool as a subprocess of the controller.
The use of OpenFlow for the fast-path interface greatly simplified implementation
of the prototype. While only OpenFlow 1.0 capability is required for the trivial actions
of selecting output ports based on 4-tuple matches, this would have been difficult or im-
possible to achieve on Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware without OpenFlow.
The prototype was also tested successfully with Mininet [43], demonstrating that it is
compatible with multiple OpenFlow dataplanes.
Until very recently,1 OpenFlow lacked a match type for TCP flags [80]. While support
for TCP flag matching is available in open vSwitch (OVS), hardware is not yet available
with OpenFlow 1.5 support. This prevents the prototype from detecting TCP connection
tear-down in the forwarding plane, and necessitates the use of idle-timeouts for flow rules
to clean up the fast-path when connections complete. The disadvantage of the idle-
timeout approach is that stalled connections will be routed via the slow-path briefly, if
and when they resume.
Despite some minor obstacles detailed above, our implementation demonstrates the
feasibility of key aspects of NFShunt’s design: hardware acceleration, integration into
iptables, and the COTS toolkit approach.
5.2 Experimental performance analysis
Research question two in table 4.1 requires the outcome of our hypothesis tests to be
analysed to support conclusions about the performance merits of our prototype for Fast
Data Transfer (FDT) applications.
Our experiments found that the delay of the slow-path interface (detecting new
connections as tracked by the kernel) is small (approximately 3ms). Sending shunting
flow specifications to the switch makes up the majority of the delay between the first and
the last packet being slow-switched (approximately 60ms out of 75ms).2 These results are
provided in table 4.3. Based on examination of Web100 traces for individual connections
(sampled on one of the test servers every 100ms), we conclude that no congestion events
are caused by the shunting mechanism, because no such events are reported in the first
sample (which would include all the slow-switched packets). These results show that our
design can respond fast enough to the establishment of individual connections.
1OpenFlow 1.5, published in December 2014 includes a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) flags
match type.
2Flow specification programming delay can be attributed the controller itself, the control network,
the OpenFlow agent and the switch ASIC, as well as the respective operating systems. The relative
contributions of each component was not investigated.
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The Pica8 OpenFlow switch used for our experiments was able to forward all con-
nections without packet loss (table 4.4). Despite the host tuning performed, a notable
TCP performance drop-off was observed at 400ms. This suggested that TCP through-
put would not be the best (albeit direct) measurement of firewall performance in our
experiments.3 We therefore ensured that packet loss could be accurately measured and
located to specific network elements.
An explanation offered by ESNet [22] for the tendency of traditional firewalls to drop
packets in FDT applications, as well as one of our initial assumptions (section 1.2.1),
predicted that the total throughput would be approximately quantised by the maximum
per-connection throughput (the quantum being less than the speed of the fastest firewall
interface).
When there was no synthetic delay, the Cisco ASA consistently dropped a small
percentage of packets (table 4.4), but was able to firewall a single connection at nearly
the maximum speed achievable with the test setup (near 10Gbps). From this we infer
that the Cisco firewall we tested is not relying on load-balancing multiple connections
over processing elements in the forwarding plane to reach aggregate 10Gbps throughput.
Transferring data over simultaneous TCP connections was quite effective at overcom-
ing the high latency TCP slow-down due to loss introduced by the firewall (table 4.5),
and thus utilising nearly the full link bandwidth at moderate Round-Trip Time (RTT).
This supports ESNet’s alternative suggestion [23] that the packet loss we found is due
to traditional firewall input buffers not being optimised for large flows. This insight
also reveals a limitation of our study: the experimental design choice to focus on TCP
did not allow more extensive exploration of the FDT problem space (for example, by
studying transport protocols that circumvent TCP’s limitations).
A very small amount of packet loss was observed in the tests of the prototype with
no synthetic delay (table 4.4). While this is not a statistically significant difference
from the direct switching tests (according to our interpretation of p-values), a 21Mbps
difference in throughput was found to be statistically significant. At 100ms, 200ms and
400ms, there were no differences between the measurements of the prototype and direct
switching (table 4.6 and table 4.7). These results are consistent with a model where the
slow-path phase of the connection has little effect on performance (with TCP, this phase
covers the connection setup, and at worst the slow-start phase of data transfer) because
the packet-rate is low enough to software switched without packet loss.
Under load, the difference in packet loss, combined with moderate RTT, results in
3As an end-to-end performance measure, TCP throughput could be influenced by factors not con-
trolled in our experments.
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a significant degradation of throughput performance of the tested Cisco firewall model
to other approaches (such as our NFShunt prototype or that of a science DMZ). This
result allows us to answer the research questions: our hybrid design achieves high
performance and exhibits the loss-free forwarding behaviour required for
data-intensive science applications.
5.3 Operations and maintenance analysis
Now we examine technical aspects of the prototype and traditional firewall designs,
studied in the context of operations and maintenance. This analysis supports conclusions
to research question four (table 4.1). The Fault, Configuration, AAA, Performance and
Security management (FCAPS) framework [38] is used to consider the different activities
involved in operating firewalls.
5.3.1 Fault management
NFShunt’s open architecture allows for more in-depth troubleshooting of the individual
components compared to a traditional firewall. Open source software can be audited,
and bugs in NFShunt’s code can be found and fixed by the end-users. The downside of
this tool-kit approach is that administrators would require knowledge to troubleshoot
Netfilter, Linux bridging and the OpenFlow agent to locate faults in the firewall itself.
A traditional firewall typically offers a unified interface, which aids troubleshooting of
simple problems, but could obscure low-level details that only vendor technical support
may be able to access and interpret. Compared to pure software firewalling, the shunting
approach is more complex: it introduces additional components to the forwarding path,
more configuration and another software component. We expect that this additional
complexity would result in a less reliable system.
5.3.2 Configuration management
NFShunt does not offer standard interfaces and protocols for network configuration man-
agement, like Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), or more recently Netconf.
Netfilter is, however, very widely used, and many tools and interfaces exist to manage
iptables rule-sets. The design that integrates shunting policy in the iptables rules, rather
than maintaining a separate configuration, reduces the complexity of managing its con-
figuration. For configuration of the controller – the design has chosen a format that is
concise and easy for administrators to both read and write.
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5.3.3 Account management
The shunting design implicitly requires network traffic to be accounted separately on
the slow and fast paths. While shunted packets are no longer visible to tools that might
normally be used on Netfilter firewalls, NFShunt exposes flow statistics via the logging
module. It is possible to integrate these statistics into existing reporting and accounting
tools to achieve feature parity with a traditional firewall design.
5.3.4 Performance management
Other than allowing the usual process of measurement, planning and provisioning of
resources to meet the demands on the network (common with traditional firewalls),
NFShunt has the advantage of being able to selectively scale up throughput via shunt-
ing. This additional capability is the primary contribution of the prototype, and is the
advantage of NFShunt over alternative approaches.
5.3.5 Security management
NFShunt’s advantages contribute to the network’s resources to implement security with-
out compromising on performance. The security of NFShunt itself is composed of Linux
and the OpenFlow agent’s security measures.
The NFShunt controller requires administrator level rights to the Linux system for
access to the connection tracking module. While not implemented in our prototype,
it is possible to compartmentalise functions of the controller to reduce privileges of all
components but the slow path interface. Configuration of Netfilter via the iptables
utility is performed by a user with administrative rights.
The prototype implementation did not make use of OpenFlow protocol security be-
yond static address configuration. The controller could be enhanced to use Transport
Layer Security (TLS) encrypted and authenticated connections for agents that support
this capability, however, the Pica8 switch used in our research did not include secure
control channel support.
5.4 Price-performance comparison
Finally, consider both the up-front equipment cost, as well as the ongoing costs of oper-
ating a firewall, in order to answer research question three as per table 4.1:
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5.4.1 Capital cost
Cost of infrastructure is important as high-throughput science expands from the preserve
of the few to that of the many.
The capital cost4 of the Cisco ASA5585-X SSP-60 firewall used for testing varies
between R1M and R2M, depending on configuration, licensing and discounts applied.
Since this particular firewall’s features and capabilities far exceed the requirements of our
tested scenario, a smaller configuration was chosen for the purpose of pricing comparison
with the prototype. The Cisco ASA5580-20 configured with two 10G interfaces matches
the prototype firewall more closely. Table 5.1 shows the capital cost of our prototype
compared to the specified traditional firewall.
NFShunt Prototype Traditional Firewall
Component Cost Component Cost
FitPC R7291 Cisco ASA5580-20 R720 000
Pica8 P3290 R32 005
Total R38 296 Total R720 000
Table 5.1: Capital cost comparison
5.4.2 Operational cost
Real world implementations of NFShunt would allow the operational costs to be quanti-
fied and compared, but this is not within the scope of our research. Instead, we analyse
the technical aspects of our design that would impact operations and maintenance. As
such, our research methodology for studying the operational costs is qualitative.
In general, it is expected that the additional complexity of the NFShunt prototype
(described in section 3.5) is likely to increase its operational costs relative to operating
traditional firewalls (though the absolute cost could still be lower). Some traditional
firewall vendors generate additional revenue from their products by charging license fees
as the customer requires additional software features or artificially limited capacity. From
the customer’s perspective, these are operational costs that would not necessarily apply
to a hybrid firewall composed of COTS hardware and Free and Open Source Software
(FOSS).
4ZAR prices at various exchange rates from 12 to 14 ZAR/USD
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5.4.3 Analysing cost performance
The above analysis of the costs associated with our toolkit-like design support an an-
swer to the research question: the prototype is clearly low-cost compared to the class-
representitive traditional firewall we studied. With higher performance, NFShunt would
deliver a lower price-performance ratio. The total cost of ownership is unknown (and
will vary, even amongst deployments of traditional firewalls). Based on our analysis in
section 5.3, we argue that the cost of operating NFShunt in production would be similar
to a traditional firewall, as the benefit of its flexibility comes at the cost of increased
complexity.
5.5 Limitations of the research
Some convenient experimental design choices resulted in minor shortcomings of the re-
search:
• If we assume that traditional firewalls optimise buffers for the distribution of packet
sizes typical to Internet traffic, then varying the Maximum Transmission Unit
(MTU) value in our TCP experiments may have revealed whether the best-practice
of using jumbo frames in FDT applications has a detrimental effect on firewall
performance.
• Connection-rate testing would likely have shown up processing delay limits of the
shunting mechanism which could severely limit the suitability of our design for
applications where off-loaded connections are numerous (unlike the FDT scenario).
We expect traditional firewalls would out-perform our prototype in such cases, but
since we did not study this dimension of scalability, this remains speculation.
The major shortcomings of our research, however, were due to the deliberately re-
stricted scope:
• The lack of a real-world NFShunt deployment case-study restricted our investiga-
tion of operational aspects to arguments based on the theoretical implications of
our prototype’s design. Rich performance data from production application traf-
fic may also have provided further insights and strengthened the reliability of our
results.
• Testing high-performance traditional firewalls from a range of models and manufac-
turers would have allowed general conclusions to be drawn about the performance
of firewalls used in data-intensive research infrastructure.
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• Finally, broadening the scope of the research to study multiple file transfer tools
and transport protocols, as well as to consider the information security threat
model of science DMZs, may have generated knowledge useful to end-users and
operators.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and future work
In this chapter we provide a conclusion to our research, and explore possible directions
for future work.
6.1 Research conclusions
Our test of the Cisco firewall suggests that there is merit in engineering networks for
loss-free paths to serve the narrow use-cases addressed by science DMZs (single or small
numbers of high bandwidth-delay product connections between research infrastructures).
Due to the limited design of the experiments we performed, we cannot generalise this
conclusion to all traditional firewalls. We speculate that some firewalls are, or with
advances in technology will be, capable of stateful packet filtering of single connections
at very high speeds, without introducing packet loss.
We conclude that, as an interim measure or an alternative to static separation of end-
points into classes protected by stateful and stateless (ACL) packet filters, it is possible to
build a hybrid firewall that off-loads trusted connections to stateless hardware switching.
Our prototype demonstrates the feasibility of an Software Defined Networking (SDN)-
based design, making use of widely used Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) for
the stateful slow-path, and vendor-agnostic OpenFlow forwarding for the fast-path. Our
experiments verify that the performance of dynamically off-loaded Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) connections benefit from science DMZ-like loss-free forwarding. These
results address the research problem, and answer the research questions one and two
(posed in 3.1).
Analysing the capital costs of implementing our prototype shows potential for sub-
stantial savings over the cost of traditional firewalls with similar performance charac-
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teristics (by our estimate, at least an order of magnitude less). The operational ben-
efits of composing OpenFlow switching with Linux’s Netfilter are difficult to quantify
and may be outweighed by increased complexity. Due to network latency, the science
use-case requires loss-free forwarding in countries that are geographically distant from
collaborators in Europe and North America. This work is particularly important due
to cost-constraints where those countries are also developing or newly industrialised na-
tions. This answers research question three and, to the extent possible within the scope
of the study, it suggests possible answers to question four.
Finally, the parallel-flow performance results via a non-ideal network path suggests
that improving TCP, or adopting better file transfer tools, should be seriously considered
as an alternative to building loss-free networks. Our experimental design did not pro-
duce data that allowed us to evaluate and compare firewall performance with non-TCP
connections.
6.2 Future work
Considering the problem of Science DMZ security, two avenues for future research are
immediately evident:
• Our focus on an SDN-based hybrid firewall implementation makes some assump-
tions about the information security threat model and application design. A study
focused on data-intensive research network use-cases that examines real-world ap-
plications, and considers a comprehensive threat model, is called for.
• An investigation into the real-world performance of SDN-enhanced science DMZs
(especially operations and maintenance aspects) would be valuable to operators of
High Performance Computing (HPC) infrastructure. IDS-driven alternatives such
as SciPass offer unique advantages over NFShunt’s design, and we hope to see both
systems deployed and evaluated in production networks.
The introduction of a Linux driver framework for switch-like devices (switchdev [67])
provides a mechanism to manipulate hardware off-loaded forwarding using standard
Linux IP routing and Ethernet bridging utilities. While this functionality appears to be
intended for tight integration with local hardware, it may be possible to extend switchdev
to support remote forwarding planes via OpenFlow. If Netfilter oﬄoading could then be
added to switchdev, it might be possible to re-implement NFShunt in the Linux kernel.
Alternatively, an NFShunt-specific Netfilter target would improve the integration with
the Linux kernel and allow for the user-interface enhancement suggested in section 5.1.
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Similarly, integration between open vSwitch (OVS) and Netfilter connection tracking
[65] (expected to be available at the end of 2015) could enable hardware acceleration
directly in the OpenFlow agent.
More generally, future work could explore using hybrid SDN designs in different
applications, for example:
• Adding a shunting mechanism to routing (as opposed to transparent) firewalls may
be useful in certain network designs. Initial work on chaining NFShunt into the
forwarding path of larger SDN-enabled systems such as Vandervecken [71] (a fork
of RouteFlow [59]) shows promise.
• The use of NFShunt’s block action (which allows the slow path firewall rules to
off-load packets to be dropped to hardware) was briefly tested, but not explored
in our research. This function could form part of a denial-of-service mitigation
system with applications beyond the science DMZ use-case.
A new field, related to SDN is Network Function Virtualisation (NFV). This is
an architecture that replaces dedicated hardware appliances performing fixed network
functions (such as firewalls, proxies, etc.) with virtualised servers performing the same
functions. Since NFV is based on software implementations running on normal CPUs, it
would be subject to similar scalability constraints to traditional firewalls. As with other
cloud-based computing architectures, NFV typically relies on a scalability strategy of
parallel processing (scaling-out). NFShunt could be enhanced to provide a standard
interface for a virtualised slow path to off-load forwarding of specific connections to
hardware. An implementation of hybrid-NFV such as this could provide a mechanism
to scale-up the performance of virtual network functions.
Finally, some cutting-edge, SDN-enabled hardware platforms support the tracking of
transport layer states in the forwarding plane. Open standards to take advantage of this
capability could enhance NFShunt-like designs, if not eliminate the need for state-less
packet filtering (and hence science DMZs) entirely.
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Appendix A
openVSwitch usage
Mininet [43] is a network prototyping tool that uses OS-level virtualisation to allow
the creation of logically independent host, router and switch nodes, interconnected by
virtual network links.
To demonstrate the use of open vSwitch (OVS) commands, we show the simplest
Mininet example (the minimal topology illustrated in figure A.1) by running sudo mn
-x. This creates four terminal windows, one for each node.
Figure A.1: Mininet’s minimal topology
Accessing the switch, we can query the OVS configuration database:
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switch s1 # ovs-vsctl show
0b8ed0aa-67ac-4405-af13-70249a7e8a96
Bridge "s1"
Controller "tcp:127.0.0.1:6633"
is_connected: true
Controller "ptcp:6634"
fail_mode: secure
Port "s1-eth1"
Interface "s1-eth1"
Port "s1-eth2"
Interface "s1-eth2"
Port "s1"
Interface "s1"
type: internal
ovs_version: "2.0.2"
In addition to the two ports connecting host h1 and h2, each OVS bridge (switch
instance) has an internal port with the same name as the bridge. This port is logically
connected to the host IP stack and can be used by the host system to communicate via
the bridge.
Since ovs-vswitchd applies this configuration to the data-path, we can obtain similar
information by querying the data-path directly using ovs-dpctl:
switch s1 # ovs-dpctl show
system@ovs-system:
lookups: hit:3 missed:21 lost:0
flows: 0
port 0: ovs-system (internal)
port 1: s1-eth1
port 2: s1-eth2
port 3: s1 (internal)
While OVS data-paths require the features to implement OpenFlow forwarding be-
haviour, OVS abstracts away all the OpenFlow-specific semantics. Note that informa-
tion regarding the OpenFlow controller and controller-failure mode are absent from the
ovs-dpctl output.
With ovs-ofctl, we can use the OpenFlow protocol to query the capability of the
switch:
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switch s1 # ovs-ofctl show s1
OFPT_FEATURES_REPLY (xid=0x2): dpid:0000000000000001
n_tables:254, n_buffers:256
capabilities: FLOW_STATS TABLE_STATS PORT_STATS QUEUE_STATS ARP_MATCH_IP
actions: OUTPUT SET_VLAN_VID SET_VLAN_PCP STRIP_VLAN SET_DL_SRC SET_DL_DST
SET_NW_SRC SET_NW_DST SET_NW_TOS SET_TP_SRC SET_TP_DST ENQUEUE
1(s1-eth1): addr:4a:15:3a:ad:7f:98
config: 0
state: 0
current: 10GB-FD COPPER
speed: 10000 Mbps now, 0 Mbps max
2(s1-eth2): addr:ba:0f:c6:93:44:f5
config: 0
state: 0
current: 10GB-FD COPPER
speed: 10000 Mbps now, 0 Mbps max
LOCAL(s1): addr:3a:ce:8d:ef:b6:48
config: 0
state: 0
speed: 0 Mbps now, 0 Mbps max
OFPT_GET_CONFIG_REPLY (xid=0x4): frags=normal miss_send_len=0
Notable in the output is support for multiple OpenFlow tables (n tables:254), as
well as the switch capabilities and supported actions.
Querying the switch’s OpenFlow table at this point shows that no flow entries have
been programmed:
switch s1 # ovs-ofctl dump-flows s1
NXST_FLOW reply (xid=0x4):
The minimal topology Mininet example configures a reference OpenFlow controller
included in OVS for the switch to connect to. This implements a basic layer-2 Media
Access Control (MAC)-address learning Ethernet switch that maintains state in the
controller and reactively populates the switch with micro-flows.1 If we generate traffic
between h1 and h2 by executing ping, and then query the table again, we can see flow
entries added for Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) between the two switch ports:
1flow specifications that map to individual transport layer connections (by specifying a 5-tuple of
matches.
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host h1 # ping 10.0.0.2
PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.0.0.2: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=5.51 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.2: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.623 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.2: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.050 ms
...output truncated.
switch s1 # ovs-ofctl dump-flows s1
NXST_FLOW reply (xid=0x4):
cookie=0x0, duration=307.399s, table=0, n_packets=9, n_bytes=378,
idle_timeout=60, idle_age=15, priority=65535,arp,in_port=2,
vlan_tci=0x0000,dl_src=96:0f:63:93:27:73,dl_dst=06:49:6b:f9:de:08,
arp_spa=10.0.0.2,arp_tpa=10.0.0.1,arp_op=1 actions=output:1
cookie=0x0, duration=307.398s, table=0, n_packets=9, n_bytes=378,
idle_timeout=60, idle_age=15, priority=65535,arp,in_port=1,
vlan_tci=0x0000,dl_src=06:49:6b:f9:de:08,dl_dst=96:0f:63:93:27:73,
arp_spa=10.0.0.1,arp_tpa=10.0.0.2,arp_op=2 actions=output:2
cookie=0x0, duration=312.4s, table=0, n_packets=313, n_bytes=30674,
idle_timeout=60, idle_age=0, priority=65535,icmp,in_port=2,
vlan_tci=0x0000,dl_src=96:0f:63:93:27:73,dl_dst=06:49:6b:f9:de:08,
nw_src=10.0.0.2,nw_dst=10.0.0.1,nw_tos=0,icmp_type=0,icmp_code=0
actions=output:1
cookie=0x0, duration=311.401s, table=0, n_packets=312, n_bytes=30576,
idle_timeout=60, idle_age=0, priority=65535,icmp,in_port=1,
vlan_tci=0x0000,dl_src=06:49:6b:f9:de:08,dl_dst=96:0f:63:93:27:73,
nw_src=10.0.0.1,nw_dst=10.0.0.2,nw_tos=0,icmp_type=8,icmp_code=0
actions=output:2
In the above listing we have underlined the matches, while the action for each flow
specification is boldface. The idle age (idle age) of the first two flows that match on
the ARP packets shows that the ping command had been running for approximately
15 seconds. All the flows are configured with an idle timeout (idle timeout) of sixty
seconds. The idle ages of the two ICMP flow specifications are zero because they had
been reset by an ICMP echo-reply pair within the same second that the ovs-ofctl
command queried the switch. Stopping the ping command and waiting sixty seconds
would cause all flow specifications to time out, and would leave the flow table empty.
OVS is pre-configured by Mininet according to the given topology. For the purpose
of our research, manually creating an OVS bridge, adding ports to it and configuring a
controller for the bridge are the most important uses of the OVS command line utilities.
We use the ovs-vsctl command for all three tasks. In the example below, we create
a new bridge named s2, and add the port named eth0 to this bridge:
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# ovs-vsctl add-br s2
# ovs-vsctl add-port s2 eth0
# ovs-vsctl set-controller s2 tcp:192.0.2.1:6633
These commands accept additional parameters that may be required with non-Linux
kernel data-path implementations and to specify extra port properties. Finally, our
experiments require access to port frame counters to detect and locate packet loss. We
also obtain these counters using a ovs-vsctl command:
# ovs-vsctl get Interface eth0 statistics
{collisions=0, rx_bytes=150, rx_crc_err=0, rx_dropped=0, rx_errors=0,
rx_frame_err=0, rx_over_err=0, rx_packets=2, tx_bytes=0, tx_dropped=0,
tx_errors=0, tx_packets=0}
Appendix B
Source code listing
Listing B.1: NFShunt POX controller
1 # C o p y r i g h t 2014 CSIR
2 #
3 # Licensed under t h e Apache License , Vers ion 2 . 0 ( t h e ” L i c e n s e ”) ;
4 # you may not use t h i s f i l e e x c e p t in compl iance w i t h t h e L i c e n s e .
5 # You may o b t a i n a copy o f t h e L i c e n s e a t
6 #
7 # h t t p : / /www. apache . org / l i c e n s e s /LICENSE−2.0
8 #
9 # Unless r e q u i r e d by a p p l i c a b l e law or agreed t o in w r i t i n g , s o f t w a r e
10 # d i s t r i b u t e d under t h e L i c e n s e i s d i s t r i b u t e d on an ”AS IS ” BASIS ,
11 # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, e i t h e r e x p r e s s or i m p l i e d .
12 # See t h e L i c e n s e f o r t h e s p e c i f i c l a n g u a g e g o v e r n i n g p e r m i s s i o n s and
13 # l i m i t a t i o n s under t h e L i c e n s e .
14
15 import os
16 import sys
17 from pox . core import core
18 import pox . openflow . l i bopen f l ow 01 as o f
19 from pox . l i b . u t i l import dpidToStr
20 import pox . l i b . packet as pkt # POX c o n v e n t i o n
21 from thread ing import Thread
22 from xml . e t r e e import ElementTree
23 from i o import BytesIO
24 from subprocess import Popen , PIPE
25 import j son
26 import re
27
28 log = core . getLogger ( )
29
30 class NFShunt( object ) :
31 def i n i t ( s e l f , c on f i g f i l e name ) :
32 s e l f . connect ion = None
33 s e l f . c on f i g = None
34 s e l f . r e ad con f i g ( c on f i g f i l e name )
35 core . openflow . addLi s tener s ( s e l f )
36 #core . addListenerByName (” DownEvent ” , s e l f . handle DownEvent ) # WHY? !
37 core . addListenerByName ( ”GoingDownEvent” , s e l f . handle GoingDownEvent ) # WHY? !
38 log . i n f o ( ”Launch complete , wa i t ing f o r OF connect ion . . . ” )
39
40 def r e ad con f i g ( s e l f , c on f i g f i l e name ) :
41 text = open( c on f i g f i l e name ) . read ( )
42 try :
43 s e l f . c on f i g = json . l oads ( text )
44 s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ po r t s l ow ’ ] = {}
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45 s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ p o r t f a s t ’ ] = {}
46 s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ port physdev in ’ ] = {}
47 for port in s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ por t s ’ ] :
48 s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ po r t s l ow ’ ] [ port [ ’ s low ’ ] ] = port
49 s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ p o r t f a s t ’ ] [ port [ ’ f a s t ’ ] ] = port
50 s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ port physdev in ’ ] [ port [ ’ physdevin ’ ] ] = port
51 except Exception as e :
52 raise type ( e ) , type ( e ) ( e . message + ’ happens with [%s ] ’ % text ) , sys .
e x c i n f o ( ) [ 2 ]
53
54 def connt rack read event s ( s e l f , stdout , dummy) :
55 for l i n e in i ter ( stdout . r ead l ine , b ’ ’ ) :
56 i f l i n e . f i nd ( ” f low ” ) !=−1: # conntrack sometimes o u t p u t non−XML l i n e s
57 try :
58 e t r e e = ElementTree . parse ( BytesIO ( l i n e ) )
59 ev = next ( e t r e e . i ter ( ) )
60 except :
61 log . e r r o r ( ’ Fa i l ed to parse event data : {} ’ . format (
ev xml ) )
62 continue
63 i f ev i s None :
64 continue
65 s e l f . t ry shunt ing ( ev )
66
67 def t ry shunt ing ( s e l f , f low ) :
68 try :
69 i f not f low . f i n d a l l ( ” .//mark” ) : return
70 eventtype = None
71 i f ’ type ’ in f low . a t t r i b :
72 eventtype = f low . a t t r i b [ ’ type ’ ]
73 i f eventtype in [ ” dest roy ” ] : return
74 mark = int ( f low . f i nd ( ’ . //meta [ @di rect ion=”independent ” ]/mark ’ ) . t ext )
75 connid = int ( f low . f i nd ( ’ . //meta [ @di rect ion=”independent ” ]/ id ’ ) . t ext )
76 timeout = None
77 t imeouttag = f low . f i nd ( ’ . //meta [ @di rect ion=”independent ” ]/ timeout ’ )
78 i f t imeouttag i s not None : t imeouttag . t ext
79 s t a t e = None
80 s t a t e t ag = f low . f i nd ( ’ . //meta [ @di rect ion=”independent ” ]/ s t a t e ’ )
81 i f s t a t e t ag i s not None : s t a t e = s ta t e t ag . t ext
82 c l i e n t i p t a g = f low . f i nd ( ’ . //meta [ @di rect ion=”o r i g i n a l ” ]/ l aye r3 / s r c ’ )
83 s e r v e r i p t a g = f low . f i nd ( ’ . //meta [ @di rect ion=”o r i g i n a l ” ]/ l aye r3 / dst ’ )
84 c l i e n t p o r t t a g = f low . f i nd ( ’ . //meta [ @di rec t ion=”o r i g i n a l ” ]/ l aye r4 /
spor t ’ )
85 s e r v e r p o r t t a g = f low . f i nd ( ’ . //meta [ @di rect ion=”o r i g i n a l ” ]/ l aye r4 /
dport ’ )
86 i f c l i e n t i p t a g i s None or s e r v e r i p t a g i s None or c l i e n t p o r t t a g i s
None or s e r v e r p o r t t a g i s None :
87 log . debug ( ”Flow doesn ’ t have a l l L3 and L4 i n f o we need ,
i gno r ing . ” )
88 return
89 c l i e n t i p = c l i e n t i p t a g . t ext
90 s e r v e r i p = s e r v e r i p t a g . t ext
91 c l i e n t p o r t = int ( c l i e n t p o r t t a g . t ext )
92 s e r v e r p o r t = int ( s e r v e r p o r t t a g . t ext )
93 except Exception as e :
94 raise type ( e ) , type ( e ) ( e . message + ’ happens with [%s ] ’ % ElementTree .
t o s t r i n g ( f low ) ) , sys . e x c i n f o ( ) [ 2 ]
95 f l a g s = mark >> 28
96 f l a g s phy sdev in = ( f l a g s & 0x4 ) >> 2
97 f l ag s physdevout = ( f l a g s & 0x2 ) >> 1
98 i f not ( f l a g s phy sdev in and f l ag s physdevout ) :
99 log . debug ( ”Flow i s probably not v ia one o f the slow path ports ,
i gno r ing . ” )
100 return
101 f l ag s f l owmark = f l a g s & 0x1
102 physdevin = (mark & 0x0f000000 ) >> 24
103 physdevout = (mark & 0x00f00000 ) >> 20
104 flowmark = (mark & 0x000f0000 ) >> 16
105 o f p o r t s i n = s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ port physdev in ’ ] [ physdevin ] [ ’ f a s t ’ ]
106 o f p o r t s o u t = s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ port physdev in ’ ] [ physdevout ] [ ’ f a s t ’ ]
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107 o f p o r t s = [ o f p o r t s i n , o f p o r t s o u t ]
108 log . i n f o ( ”Conntrack event : type=%s mark=%s [ f l a g s =(pdin=%s , pdout=%s , f low=%s ) ]
pdin=%s , pdout=%s , flowmark=%s , connid=%s , timeout=%s , s t a t e=%s , c l i e n t=%s
:%s , s e r v e r=%s :%s” %
109 tuple (map( str , [ eventtype , hex(mark ) , f l ag s physdev in , f l ags physdevout
, f l ags f lowmark , physdevin , physdevout , flowmark ,
110 connid , timeout , s tate , c l i e n t i p , c l i e n t p o r t , s e r v e r i p ,
s e r v e r p o r t ] ) ) )
111 i f f l ag s f l owmark :
112 i f s t a t e in [ ”FIN WAIT” , ”LAST ACK” , ”TIME WAIT” ] :
113 log . i n f o ( ”Not i n s t a l l i n g shunt because connect ion s t a t e i s %s ”
% s ta t e )
114 else :
115 ac t i on = s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ mark act ions ’ ] [ str ( flowmark ) ]
116 log . i n f o ( ”User po l i c y flowmark o f %d detected in conntrack
entry , ac t i on i s : %s ” % ( flowmark , ac t i on ) )
117 i f ac t i on == ” ignore ” :
118 log . i n f o ( ”Doing nothing , because user po l i c y asked us
to ignore t h i s f low . ” )
119 # i f d e f a u l t n o s h u n t i n g=true , t h i s i s e q u i v a l e n t t o
f o r c i n g v i a t h e s low path
120 else :
121 i f ac t i on == ”shunt” :
122 # For s h u n t i n g we add f l o w s t o match , which
send p a c k e t s v i a f a s t pa th
123 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . ofp f low mod ( ac t i on=of .
o fp ac t i on output ( port=o f p o r t s [ 1 ] ) , # i f
p a c k e t came from o f p o r t s [ 0 ] , send t o
o f p o r t s [ 1 ]
124 match=of . ofp match ( i n po r t=o f p o r t s [ 0 ] ,
d l type=0x800 , nw dst=s e r v e r i p ,
nw src=c l i e n t i p ,
125 nw proto=pkt . ipv4 .TCP PROTOCOL, t p s r c=
c l i e n t p o r t , tp ds t=s e r v e r p o r t ) ,
126 p r i o r i t y =33000 , i d l e t imeou t=s e l f . c on f i g
[ ’ d e f au l t shunt t imeout ’ ] ,
127 f l a g s=of .OFPFF SEND FLOW REM, cook ie=
connid ) )
128 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . ofp f low mod ( ac t i on=of .
o fp ac t i on output ( port=o f p o r t s [ 0 ] ) , # i f
p a c k e t came from o f p o r t s [ 1 ] , send t o
o f p o r t s [ 0 ]
129 match=of . ofp match ( i n po r t=o f p o r t s [ 1 ] ,
d l type=0x800 , nw dst=c l i e n t i p ,
nw src=s e r v e r i p ,
130 nw proto=pkt . ipv4 .TCP PROTOCOL, t p s r c=
se rve r po r t , tp ds t=c l i e n t p o r t ) ,
131 p r i o r i t y =33000 , i d l e t imeou t=s e l f . c on f i g
[ ’ d e f au l t shunt t imeout ’ ] ,
132 f l a g s=of .OFPFF SEND FLOW REM, cook ie=
connid ) )
133 log . i n f o ( ”Shunt i n s t a l l e d f o r s e r v e r %s :%d [ v ia
port %d ] −> c l i e n t %s :%d [ v ia port %d ] −
conntrack id %d”
134 % ( s e r v e r i p , s e rv e r po r t , o f p o r t s [ 1 ] ,
c l i e n t i p , c l i e n t p o r t , o f p o r t s
[ 0 ] , connid ) )
135 log . i n f o ( ”Shunt i n s t a l l e d f o r c l i e n t %s :%d [ v ia
port %d ] −> s e r v e r %s :%d [ v ia port %d ] −
conntrack id %d”
136 % ( c l i e n t i p , c l i e n t p o r t , o f p o r t s [ 0 ] ,
s e r v e r i p , s e rv e r po r t , o f p o r t s
[ 1 ] , connid ) )
137 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . o f p s t a t s r e q u e s t ( body=
of . o f p f l ow s t a t s r e q u e s t ( ) ) )
138 e l i f ac t i on == ”block ” :
139 # For b l o c k i n g we add f l o w s t o match , which
send p a c k e t s t o dev n u l l
140 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . ofp f low mod ( ac t i on =[ ] ,
# empty a c t i o n l i s t == drop
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141 match=of . ofp match ( i n po r t=o f p o r t s [ 0 ] ,
d l type=0x800 , nw dst=s e r v e r i p ,
nw src=c l i e n t i p ,
142 nw proto=pkt . ipv4 .TCP PROTOCOL, t p s r c=
c l i e n t p o r t , tp ds t=s e r v e r p o r t ) ,
143 p r i o r i t y =33000 , i d l e t imeou t=s e l f . c on f i g
[ ’ d e f au l t b l o ck t imeou t ’ ] ,
144 f l a g s=of .OFPFF SEND FLOW REM, cook ie=
connid ) )
145 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . ofp f low mod ( ac t i on =[ ] ,
# empty a c t i o n l i s t == drop
146 match=of . ofp match ( i n po r t=o f p o r t s [ 1 ] ,
d l type=0x800 , nw dst=c l i e n t i p ,
nw src=s e r v e r i p ,
147 nw proto=pkt . ipv4 .TCP PROTOCOL, t p s r c=
se rve r po r t , tp ds t=c l i e n t p o r t ) ,
148 p r i o r i t y =33000 , i d l e t imeou t=s e l f . c on f i g
[ ’ d e f au l t b l o ck t imeou t ’ ] ,
149 f l a g s=of .OFPFF SEND FLOW REM, cook ie=
connid ) )
150 log . i n f o ( ”Block i n s t a l l e d f o r s e r v e r %s :%d [ v ia
port %d ] −> c l i e n t %s :%d [ v ia port %d ] −
conntrack id %d”
151 % ( s e r v e r i p , s e rv e r po r t , o f p o r t s [ 1 ] ,
c l i e n t i p , c l i e n t p o r t , o f p o r t s
[ 0 ] , connid ) )
152 log . i n f o ( ”Block i n s t a l l e d f o r c l i e n t %s :%d [ v ia
port %d ] −> s e r v e r %s :%d [ v ia port %d ] −
conntrack id %d”
153 % ( c l i e n t i p , c l i e n t p o r t , o f p o r t s [ 0 ] ,
s e r v e r i p , s e rv e r po r t , o f p o r t s
[ 1 ] , connid ) )
154 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . o f p s t a t s r e q u e s t ( body=
of . o f p f l ow s t a t s r e q u e s t ( ) ) )
155 # Now t h a t we ’ ve i n s t a l l e d f l o w s , we must nuke t h e
connt rack e n t r y
156 s e l f . d e l e t e connt ra ck ( connid , c l i e n t i p , c l i e n t p o r t ,
s e r v e r i p , s e r v e r p o r t )
157
158
159 def de l e t e connt ra ck ( s e l f , connid , c l i e n t i p , c l i e n t p o r t , s e r v e r i p , s e r v e r p o r t ) :
160 log . i n f o ( ”Running command to d e l e t e conntrack entry %d” % connid )
161 os . system ( ” conntrack −D −p tcp −s %s −−spor t %d −d %s −−dport %d” % ( c l i e n t i p ,
c l i e n t p o r t , s e r v e r i p , s e r v e r p o r t ) )
162 log . i n f o ( ”Done d e l e t i n g . ” )
163
164 def handle ConnectionUp ( s e l f , event ) :
165 log . i n f o ( ”Switch %s i s up . ” , dpidToStr ( event . dpid ) )
166 s e l f . connect ion = event . connect ion
167 i f s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ d e l e t e f l ow s on s t a r t up ’ ] i s True :
168 log . i n f o ( ”De le t ing e x i s t i n g f low e n t r i e s . ” )
169 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . ofp f low mod (command=of .OFPFC DELETE) )
170 i f s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ d e f au l t no shunt ing ’ ] i s True :
171 log . i n f o ( ”Adding f low e n t r i e s f o r d e f au l t slow−path swi tch ing . ” )
172 for portgroup in s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ por t s ’ ] :
173 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . ofp f low mod ( ac t i on=of .
o fp ac t i on output ( port=portgroup [ ’ f a s t ’ ] ) ,match=of .
ofp match ( i n po r t=portgroup [ ’ s low ’ ] ) ) )
174 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . ofp f low mod ( ac t i on=of .
o fp ac t i on output ( port=portgroup [ ’ s low ’ ] ) ,match=of .
ofp match ( i n po r t=portgroup [ ’ f a s t ’ ] ) ) )
175 log . i n f o ( ”Done with setup , now ready f o r conntrack events . . . ” )
176 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . o f p s t a t s r e q u e s t ( body=of . o f p f l ow s t a t s r e q u e s t ( ) ) )
177 log . i n f o ( ” Cont ro l l e r running , checking f o r e x i s t i n g conntrack ob j e c t s . . . ” )
178 conn t r a ck ex i s t i n g = Popen ( [ ’ conntrack ’ , ’−L ’ , ’−o ’ , ’ xml , id ’ ] , s tdout=PIPE ,
bu f s i z e =1)
179 s e l f . connt rack read event s ( c onn t r a ck ex i s t i n g . stdout , True )
180 log . i n f o ( ”Done checking e x i s t i n g ob jec t s , s t a r t i n g new conntrack events p roce s s
. . . ” )
181 connt rack proce s s = Popen ( [ ’ conntrack ’ , ’−E ’ , ’−o ’ , ’ xml , id ’ ] , s tdout=PIPE ,
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bu f s i z e =1)
182 conntrack thread = Thread ( t a rg e t=s e l f . conntrack read events , args=(
connt rack proce s s . stdout , True ) )
183 conntrack thread . daemon = True
184 log . i n f o ( ” S ta r t i ng conntrack event consumer thread . . . ” )
185 conntrack thread . s t a r t ( )
186
187 def handle ConnectionDown ( s e l f , event ) :
188 log . i n f o ( ”Switch %s i s down . ” , dpidToStr ( event . dpid ) )
189 s e l f . connect ion = None
190
191 def handle FlowRemoved ( s e l f , event ) :
192 log . i n f o ( ”Switch removed f low : reason=%d cook i e=%d durat ion=%d/%d bytes=%d
packets=%d” %
193 ( event . ofp . reason , event . ofp . cookie , event . ofp . durat i on sec , event . ofp .
durat ion nsec , event . ofp . byte count , event . ofp . packet count ) )
194 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . o f p s t a t s r e q u e s t ( body=of . o f p f l ow s t a t s r e q u e s t ( ) ) )
195
196 def handle FlowStatsRece ived ( s e l f , event ) :
197 log . debug ( ”Flow s t a t s f o l l ow : ” )
198 for s t a t in event . s t a t s :
199 log . debug ( s e l f . f o rmat s t a t s ( s t a t ) )
200
201 def f o rmat s t a t s ( s e l f , s t a t ) :
202 def sa f ehex (n) :
203 i f n i s None :
204 return ” (None ) ”
205 else :
206 return hex(n)
207 def append ( obj , f , f o rmatter=str , p r e f i x=’ ’ ) :
208 try :
209 v = getattr ( obj , f )
210 i f v i s None : return ’ ’
211 return p r e f i x + f + ”=” + formatter (v )
212 except Attr ibuteError :
213 return ’ ’
214 ou t s t r = ’match : [ ’
215 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ i n po r t ’ , p r e f i x=’ ’ )
216 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ d l s r c ’ )
217 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ d l d s t ’ )
218 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ d l v l an ’ )
219 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ d l v l an pcp ’ )
220 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ d l type ’ , sa f ehex )
221 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ nw tos ’ )
222 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ nw proto ’ )
223 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ nw src ’ )
224 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ nw dst ’ )
225 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ t p s r c ’ )
226 ou t s t r += append ( s t a t . match , ’ tp ds t ’ )
227 ou t s t r += ’ ] a c t i on s : [ ’
228 f i r s t = True
229 for ac t i on in s t a t . a c t i on s :
230 i f f i r s t :
231 ou t s t r += ’ [ ’
232 f i r s t = False
233 else :
234 ou t s t r += ’ [ ’
235 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ type ’ , p r e f i x=’ ’ )
236 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ port ’ )
237 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ queue id ’ )
238 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ v l an v id ’ )
239 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ v lan pcp ’ )
240 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ d l addr ’ )
241 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ nw addr ’ )
242 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ nw tos ’ )
243 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ tp por t ’ )
244 ou t s t r += append ( act ion , ’ vendor ’ )
245 ou t s t r += ’ ] ’
246 ou t s t r += ’ ] ’
247 ou t s t r += ’ du ra t i on s e c=’ + str ( s t a t . du ra t i on s e c )
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248 ou t s t r += ’ dura t i on nsec=’ + str ( s t a t . dura t i on nsec )
249 ou t s t r += ’ p r i o r i t y=’ + str ( s t a t . p r i o r i t y )
250 ou t s t r += ’ i d l e t imeou t=’ + str ( s t a t . i d l e t imeou t )
251 ou t s t r += ’ hard t imeout=’ + str ( s t a t . hard t imeout )
252 ou t s t r += ’ cook i e=’ + str ( s t a t . cook i e )
253 ou t s t r += ’ packet count=’ + str ( s t a t . packet count )
254 ou t s t r += ’ byte count=’ + str ( s t a t . byte count )
255 return out s t r
256
257 def handle DownEvent ( s e l f , event ) :
258 log . debug ( ”Running Down event ” )
259
260 def handle GoingDownEvent ( s e l f , event ) :
261 log . debug ( ”Running GoingDown event ” )
262 i f s e l f . c on f i g [ ’ de l e t e f l ows on shutdown ’ ] i s True :
263 log . i n f o ( ”De le t ing f l ows be f o r e shut t ing down” )
264 s e l f . connect ion . send ( o f . ofp f low mod (command=of .OFPFC DELETE) )
265
266 def launch ( con f i g f i l e name=”nfshunt . j son ” ) :
267 core . r e g i s t e r ( ” nfshunt ” , NFShunt( c on f i g f i l e name ) )
Listing B.2: Sample configuration file
1 {
2 ” d e l e t e f l ow s on s t a r t up ” : t rue ,
3 ” de fau l t shunt t imeout ” : 10 ,
4 ” de f au l t b l o ck t imeou t ” : 10 ,
5 ” de f au l t no shunt ing ” : t rue ,
6 ” port s ” : [
7 {
8 ” f a s t ” : 49 ,
9 ” slow” : 10 ,
10 ”physdevin ” : 1
11 } ,
12 {
13 ” f a s t ” : 50 ,
14 ” slow” : 11 ,
15 ”physdevin ” : 2
16 }
17 ] ,
18 ”mark act ions ” : {
19 ”0” : ” i gnore ” ,
20 ”1” : ” shunt” ,
21 ”2” : ” block ”
22 }
23 }
Listing B.3: Sample iptables configuration script
1 #! / b i n / bash
2 # C o p y r i g h t 2014 CSIR
3 #
4 # Licensed under t h e Apache License , Vers ion 2 . 0 ( t h e ” L i c e n s e ”) ;
5 # you may not use t h i s f i l e e x c e p t in compl iance w i t h t h e L i c e n s e .
6 # You may o b t a i n a copy o f t h e L i c e n s e a t
7 #
8 # h t t p : / /www. apache . org / l i c e n s e s /LICENSE−2.0
9 #
10 # Unless r e q u i r e d by a p p l i c a b l e law or agreed t o in w r i t i n g , s o f t w a r e
11 # d i s t r i b u t e d under t h e L i c e n s e i s d i s t r i b u t e d on an ”AS IS ” BASIS ,
12 # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, e i t h e r e x p r e s s or i m p l i e d .
13 # See t h e L i c e n s e f o r t h e s p e c i f i c l a n g u a g e g o v e r n i n g p e r m i s s i o n s and
14 # l i m i t a t i o n s under t h e L i c e n s e .
15
16 echo ”Creat ing cha ins ”
17 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −N NFSHUNT PRE
18 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −N NFSHUNT POST
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19 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −N NFSHUNT POLICY
20 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −N NFSHUNT PRE PD IN
21 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −N NFSHUNT POST PD OUT
22
23 echo ”Adding t e s t user mark to FORWARD”
24 i p t ab l e s −t f i l t e r −A FORWARD −j MARK −−set−xmark 0x1234/0 x f f f f
25
26 echo ”Populat ing NFSHUNT PRE PD IN”
27 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT PRE PD IN −m physdev −−physdev−in p1p1 −j MARK −−set−xmark 0
x41000000 /0 x4f000000
28 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT PRE PD IN −m physdev −−physdev−in p1p2 −j MARK −−set−xmark 0
x42000000 /0 x4f000000
29 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT PRE PD IN −j RETURN
30
31 echo ”Populat ing NFSHUNT PRE”
32 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT PRE −m physdev −−physdev−in ’ ! p1+’ −j RETURN # i g n o r e p a c k e t s not
coming from t h e i n t e r f a c e s on t h e s low path
33 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT PRE −j CONNMARK −−r e s t o r e−mark # copy mark from c o n n e c t i o n s t a t e
t o p a c k e t
34 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT PRE −m mark ! −−mark 0x40000000 /0x40000000 −j NFSHUNT PRE PD IN #
i f p h y s d e v i n i s not marked , send t o cha in where we do t h i s
35 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT PRE −j RETURN
36
37 echo ”Populat ing NFSHUNT POST PD OUT”
38 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POST PD OUT −m physdev −−physdev−out p1p1 −j MARK −−set−xmark 0
x20100000 /0 x20f00000
39 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POST PD OUT −m physdev −−physdev−out p1p2 −j MARK −−set−xmark 0
x20200000 /0 x20f00000
40 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POST PD OUT −j RETURN
41
42 echo ”Populat ing NFSHUNT POLICY”
43 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POLICY −p tcp −−dport 4999 −m conntrack −−c t s t a t e RELATED,
ESTABLISHED −j MARK −−set−xmark 0x10000000 /0 x100f0000 # i g n o r e
44 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POLICY −p tcp −−dport 5000 −m conntrack −−c t s t a t e RELATED,
ESTABLISHED −j MARK −−set−xmark 0x10010000 /0 x100f0000 # shunt
45 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POLICY −p tcp −−dport 5001 −m conntrack −−c t s t a t e RELATED,
ESTABLISHED −j MARK −−set−xmark 0x10010000 /0 x100f0000 # shunt
46 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POLICY −p tcp −−dport 5666 −m conntrack −−c t s t a t e RELATED,
ESTABLISHED −j MARK −−set−xmark 0x10020000 /0 x100f0000 # b l o c k
47 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POLICY −j RETURN
48
49 echo ”Populat ing NFSHUNT POST”
50 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POST −m physdev ! −−physdev−i s−br idged −j RETURN # don ’ t b o t h e r
w i t h non−b r i d g e d p a c k e t s
51 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POST −m mark ! −−mark 0x40000000 /0x40000000 −j RETURN # i f we
didn ’ t mark p h y s d e v i n , then i t ’ s ano ther b r i d g e
52 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POST −m mark ! −−mark 0x20000000 /0x20000000 −j
NFSHUNT POST PD OUT # i f p h y s d e v o u t i s not marked , send t o cha in where we do t h i s
53 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POST −m mark ! −−mark 0x10000000 /0x10000000 −j NFSHUNT POLICY #
i f f l o w f l a g i s not se t , we need t o jump t o t h e shunt p o l i c y t a b l e
54 i p t a b l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POST −j CONNMARK −−save−mark
55 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −A NFSHUNT POST −j RETURN
56
57 echo ”Adding ru l e to PREROUTING to go to NFSHUNT PRE”
58 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −A PREROUTING −j NFSHUNT PRE
59 echo ”Adding ru l e to POSTROUTING to go to NFSHUNT POST”
60 i p t ab l e s −t mangle −A POSTROUTING −j NFSHUNT POST
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